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Introduction 
 
The proverbial Giant named hip-hop is no longer coming down from the hillside to visit 
the townspeople; it has made permanent residence in the town. Hip-hop culture is one of the 
most visible, controversial, and discussed musical genres in contemporary popular culture. 
Originating in New York City in the 1970’s, hip-hop is firmly embedded within the music and 
culture of the African diaspora, especially jazz, blues, funk, gospel, and soul music. This thesis 
will focus on the practice of sampling, the musical technique of taking a portion of a sound 
recording and reusing it to create an entirely new song. In the late 1980s, hip-hop experienced its 
“Golden Age”, with many of its artists becoming certifiable pop stars. As the music became 
more popular, the music industry began to take notice, helping to distribute this exciting new 
genre. The hip-hop of this era is characterized for its liberal use of samples – often from well-
known songs – that created a collage aesthetic immediately identifiable with the era. In 1991, 
rapper Biz Markie was sued for copyright infringement, ultimately going to court and losing the 
case in a decision that forced hip-hop artists to seriously consider the legal risks associated with 
sampling. 
 In an ideal world, copyright law promotes the creative rights of artists, protecting their 
economic rights so that they have an incentive to create. Obviously we don’t live in an ideal 
world, but hip-hop music has revealed that copyright law has not come close to its ideal. In the 
wake of the Biz Markie copyright infringement case, the music industry eventually realized that 
there were many unlicensed samples used in popular hip-hop songs. In subsequent copyright 
infringement claims levied against hip-hop artists, courts overwhelmingly favored the plaintiffs, 
agreeing that many hip-hop artists willfully broke the law with their sampling practices. 
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Gradually, a narrative began to emerge that equated sampling with theft, with plaintiffs claiming 
that sampling was a predatory art form in which hip-hop artists borrow the popularity of the 
artists they sampled to increase their sales. Critics of sampling have argued that sampling is an 
unethical musical practice, a veritable free-for-all where, instead of playing “real” instruments, 
hip-hop producers are using technology and artifice to create music more easily. The purpose of 
this thesis is to lay out the legal landscape in which this argument of “theft” has been used to 
impede the creativity of hip-hop artists. In the current legal environment, copyright is more 
efficient at protecting the rights of copyright holders, more often than not the few corporations 
that dominate the music industry. Hip-hop music has challenged assumptions about artistic 
creativity, originality, and authorship that indicate that the current copyright law must be 
reformed. 
In the first chapter, I will explore the historical context of hip-hop culture from its 
emergence in New York City up to the present day. I will detail the emergence of the musical 
practice and the larger culture with an emphasis on the development of sampling techniques. In 
addition, I will also explore the effect that the corporations that comprise the music industry have 
had on the development of hip-hop, particularly in their promulgation of many of the false 
negative assumptions that have contributed to the overall narrative equating sampling with theft. 
The endpoint of the first chapter will be an explanation of the internal set of rules that represent 
hip-hop artists’ ethics of sampling. In the second chapter I will give an overview of the United 
States copyright law, focusing on the parts of the law that challenge the practice of sampling. I 
will also explore the philosophical and historical origins of copyright law dating back to early 
iterations of copyright law in Europe. The philosophical aspects of copyright law will be a 
central focus later in the chapter when I explain how the important concepts of authorship, 
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ownership, and originality developed within copyright law. The third chapter will be structured 
as a series of case studies, which will further illuminate the issues that sampling causes within 
copyright law. In the fourth and final chapter, I will continue my discussion of problematic areas 
of copyright, specifically the inexact fit of property law theories that run throughout copyright 
law. I will also introduce some possible reforms to the current copyright system that have been 
proposed by legal scholars. Finally, I will update my earlier definition of internal sampling ethics 
focusing on the effect that technology has had on hip-hop production, and the ways in which 
producers have overcome the obstacles that arose from copyright law.  
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Chapter 1: Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Hip-hop and the Ethics of 
Sampling 
In this first chapter I will introduce hip-hop culture, discussing various issues pertinent to 
the hip-hop community, as well as common external misconceptions that have formed a negative 
stigma surrounding hip-hop from the beginning. Hip-hop has an incredibly rich musical and 
cultural history, following a similar trajectory to that of other African American music such as 
jazz and blues. Both of those early forms of black music were dismissed as fads when they first 
became noticed. Hip-hop is certainly no different, despite becoming one of the most 
recognizable and lucrative musical genres today. Many of its musical practices have made their 
presence felt in popular music, and it is virtually impossible to ignore its influence. Many hip-
hop producers, such as Pharrell, Timbaland, and Kanye West, have transcended boundaries by 
producing pop hits for a variety of artists in other genres. Furthermore, hip-hop culture has 
permeated every layer of popular culture, much to the dismay of some observers. Many of its 
critics -- particularly the media, the legal world, and politicians -- fixate on the violence, 
misogyny, and hatred towards white people, while also criticizing the use of illegal samples 
(Rose 1). Some critics have even gone so far as to say that hip-hop should not even be 
considered music, dismissing it as noise. These criticisms, while sometimes valid (particularly 
with respect to violence and misogyny in some rap lyrics), oftentimes consist of little more than 
shallow, philistine remarks.  
One of the most important techniques used to construct hip-hop songs heard today is 
sampling, the basis for hip-hop beats. The second musical element of hip-hop composition is 
rhymes performed by the MC, also more often referred to as a rapper (Schloss 2). The aesthetic 
effect of this type of composition creates a sonic collage, borrowing any sound and 
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reappropriating, remixing, and recontextualizing to create a unique song with a new meaning. 
Sampling is a consistently controversial subject. Hip-hop dee-jays and producers each have their 
own set of rules in their approach to sampling, and there has emerged throughout hip-hop a 
coherent set of internal sampling ethics. These ethics range from vague aesthetic convictions, to 
more specific technical aspects of sampling that are condemned by many hip-hop purists. 
Copyright infringement exists to protect artists’ original ideas, but inevitable difficulties arise 
when the law tries to determine what constitutes an original idea, and especially when courts are 
asked to determine whether or not a use of a sample is legal. Unfortunately, the application of the 
law has become increasingly restrictive when applied to hip-hop, negatively affecting many 
producers and forcing them to react by changing their use of samples. Many producers view the 
threat of litigation as a “threat to their aesthetic ideals and has caused them to redouble their 
efforts to emphasize sampling in their work”, while others have been “increasingly rejecting the 
use of samples in favor of other sound sources” (Schloss 6). Many of the legal decisions seem 
puzzling when viewed from an insider’s perspective, and many of the judges, lawyers, and non-
hip-hop musicians demonstrate an inherent lack of knowledge about hip-hop culture. 
The issue of sampling ethics is a divisive, labyrinthine discussion among hip-hop 
insiders, and for this reason it is frightening that an outsider is able to wield so much influence 
determining and critiquing this internal ethic. In other words, there is a well-established 
discourse of sampling ethics within hip-hop, which will be necessary to define in order to apply 
them in a substantive way to copyright infringement cases. One of the unique aspects of hip-hop 
culture is the reverence current artists have for those who came before them. What many outside 
observers might view as theft might be more properly described from an insider perspective as 
homage. Modern practices in hip-hop culture can only be fully understood within the context of 
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its history. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the internal code of sampling ethics, in order to 
properly frame the culturally illiterate angle from which the legal world views hip-hop and 
sampling. Before I explain sampling ethics, I will explore early hip-hop culture, issues 
surrounding the related concepts of authorship, originality, and authenticity, the ways in which 
constructions of race have framed and influenced the discussion surrounding hip-hop, and finally 
the transformative effect of technology on sampling practices.  
Cultural and Musical Foundations of Hip-hop 
All hip-hop, and all music for that matter is built on the music of previous artists. The 
giants of early hip-hop cast a very large shadow and their influence helped enormously to shape 
modern hip-hop musical and cultural practices. According to one of the first hip-hop artists 
Afrika Bambaataa, there are five pillars of hip-hop: MC-ing, Dee-jaying, b-boying, graffiti, and 
Knowledge, Culture, and Overstanding (Price 21, 37) (Kitwana 10). However, the author Bakari 
Kitwana notes that this definition has expanded enormously with the commercialization of hip-
hop, or more simply rap, and refers to “hip-hop specific language, body language, fashion, style, 
sensibility, and worldview” (Kitwana 10). I will use the term rap to refer to the musical 
compositions and hip-hop to refer to cultural aspects of the music both of which might seem 
foreign outsiders. In addition, hip-hop borrows elements of black cultural and musical practices 
that help to illustrate the hereditary aspect of the culture. It is the next evolution of the black 
music and cultural practices that preceded it. 
 Hip-hop combines an enormously diverse range of black cultural and musical practices 
spanning many years. Tricia Rose, in her seminal book on hip-hop culture, framed rap as a post-
literate practice that combines elements of both written and oral cultures. A post-literate practice 
such as rap music merges:  
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orally influenced traditions that are created and embedded in a postliterate, 
technologically sophisticated context. It also has the capacity to explain the way literate-
based technology is made to articulate sounds images and practices associated with orally 
based forms, so that rap simultaneously makes technology oral and technologizes 
orality”(Rose 86).  
These traditions complicate some of the important issues regarding authorship that copyright law 
often deals with. In a concrete sense, each rap song is its own unique composition created by one 
or more authors. However, the concept of authorship is blurred by both sampling and rap lyrics. 
The artistry of a rap song is not in the originality of the story, but rather the style in which it is 
performed. Technology has taken these oral practices and transformed them so that practices 
used for a more ephemeral art form can be used to create a tangible object.  
Hip-hop began in the South Bronx, originally in the form of live performances in which a 
deejay would play highly rhythmic, danceable music on turntables (Rose 2) (Schloss 2). Put 
simply, hip-hop began as party music. These parties were spontaneous in nature, with deejays 
connecting their turntables to any available electrical source (Rose 51). Kool Herc, Afrika 
Bambaataa, and Grandmaster Flash are most often identified as the pioneering deejays and 
eventually producers of hip-hop music (Fricke 22). They threw parties in the Bronx where they 
sampled the percussion breaks and extended them using turntables to create the earliest instance 
of hip-hop production. All three of these original deejays had enormous musical and cultural 
influence, pioneering some important deejay techniques. Afrika Bambataa refers to himself as 
the Godfather of deejaying and Kool Herc as the father (Fricke 45). Bambataa was also 
especially known for finding the most obscure records, and the influence of traditional African 
musical rhythms was clearly heard in his style (Fricke 46). Grandmaster Flash was especially 
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known for his use of much shorter breaks, finding it a challenge to take multiple breaks and 
blend them into one cohesive, continuous track; this also led to his perfection of an incredibly 
influential technique: scratching (Fricke 61). Although Grand Wizard Theodore is credited with 
inventing scratching, he was not well enough known to be truly influential with the technique 
(Rose 53). Scratching allows the deejay to improvise a rhythm over the breaks, adding a more 
traditional performance element. Eventually, the deejay was joined by the MC, who helped to 
keep the crowd dancing. The melding of the MC and the deejay as a singular performance unit 
created the foundation for the typical composition of the modern hip-hop group.  
Deejay performances attracted larger and larger crowds that began to require more than a 
deejay. This void was filled by the MC, short for Master of Ceremonies. Originally existing to 
primarily keep the crowd engaged in the performance, the role of the MC evolved enormously 
(Price 36).  Eventually the MC was not simply a sideshow, becoming just as popular as the 
deejays. This rise in popularity was the precursor to many popular early hip-hop groups forming, 
and was an important benchmark in the evolution of what was largely a performance-based 
musical form into something that could be recorded and consumed. In addition to being a 
founding hip-hop DJ, Grandmaster Flask also started one of the first and most recognizable, 
influential, and popular hip-hop groups: Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five. He recruited 
three friends, Kid Creole, Cowboy, and Melle Mel, to perform boasts during his shows (Rose 
54). Their success prompted them to start recording, which led to the classic song “The 
Message”. Much like the sampling and deejaying practices of hip-hop producers, MCs borrowed 
heavily from a legacy of African American orality. These Afrodiasporic practices are not highly 
visible within mainstream culture which led to confusion about the origin of certain musical and 
cultural features of hip-hop within the media and especially the legal world. However, musical 
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and cultural practices of the African diaspora were incredibly important for the disenfranchised 
youth community that existed at the beginning of hip-hop, and served a necessary purpose. 
Identity and style are incredibly important within hip-hop. This is in part due to the 
competition between different artists and their control over certain geographical areas. Deejays 
and MCs alike fought to set themselves apart from their contemporaries and were determined to 
create a unique persona and recognizable style. Tricia Rose writes at length about the importance 
of style, particularly for the youth. Hip-hop began as: 
a source for youth of alternative identity formation and social status in a community 
whose older local support institutions had been all but demolished along with large 
sectors of its built environment....Identity in hip-hop is deeply rooted in the specific, the 
local experience, and one’s attachment to and status in a local group or alternative 
family” (Rose 34).  
The “local experience” that Rose explains was one factor that created the unique competitive 
nature among hip-hop artists. There was a desire to be the best, most original artist, developing a 
style that sets one apart from everyone else. This identity formation existed outside of traditional 
means of social status attainment, and as Rose notes, this is also evident within what she 
identifies as three artistic characteristics of hip-hop: flow, layering, and ruptures in line (Rose 
38). These characteristics are especially recognizable – even to outsiders – in rap. MC’s and 
rappers constantly highlight flow as an important element of style, and explicitly reference it in 
their lyrics. Furthermore, rappers will switch up the tempo of their flow, rapidly moving through 
one passage before unexpectedly stopping or stuttering, realizing an aesthetic of rupture. The 
deejay layers over the MC’s flow and vice versa. These common musical characteristics create a 
recognizable aesthetic that “suggest affirmative ways in which profound social dislocation and 
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rupture can be managed”, creating a “blueprint for social resistance and affirmation” (Rose 39). 
Early hip-hop was largely underground, and that is where it remained until the 1980’s when hip-
hop began to reach a wider, mainstream audience that fundamentally transformed the culture, 
presenting numerous challenges and criticisms.  
Fear of a Black Planet: The Hip-Hop Colony 
Race is inseparable from the historical legacy of hip-hop, and has been at the forefront of 
the public discussion and dissection of hip-hop. This is clearly evident in the way that the media, 
politicians, and the music industry have fostered a myopic view of hip-hop within popular 
culture that legitimizes base condemnation of the hip-hop culture and its distinct musical 
practices. Hip-hop’s popularity exploded in the 1980’s, with multiple artists becoming highly 
successful, culturally recognizable icons. From 1987 to 1990 hip-hop culture became more 
visible within popular culture with numerous rap groups – such as Public Enemy, De La Soul, 
NWA, and A Tribe Called Quest – coming into prominence, not only within hip-hop but within 
the mainstream world. These groups, with their commercial success helped record industries 
understand that rap could be popular with white teenagers, despite the Afrocentricity of the lyrics 
and the culture. In fact, this Afrocentricity was actually a part of the draw among white 
teenagers, and “the conscious manipulation of racial stereotypes had become rap’s leading edge”, 
particularly in the form of the stereotypical gangsta rapper: a “thug” and “misogynist…from 
whom you would flee in abject terror if you saw him walking toward you late at night”(Samuels 
151).  As it is with much of black cultural practice, extensive white participation has inevitably 
led to reappropriation and reinterpretation of black culture; white teenage rap fans are 
particularly attracted to black culture as a site of difference, and hip-hop takes on a rebellious 
image much like that of early rock and roll. The explosion of rap during this time was enhanced 
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by the expansion of local cable access, more sophisticated mixing and recording technology, and 
the partnership between major record labels and independent labels (Rose 6). All of these factors 
dramatically altered the direction and audience of hip-hop, but not necessarily for the better. 
Major record labels and the corporate media were largely responsible for the widespread 
dissemination of the revolutionary hip-hop artist that emerged during the late 1980’s. It was also 
around this time that many of the still common mainstream characterizations of hip-hop and 
particularly rappers – the stereotype of the hypersexual, violent “thug” – were recognized by 
major record labels as an important ingredient for a successful hip-hop record. This seems 
counterintuitive, however the role of the corporate media was the driving force behind the 
creation of the outsider rhetoric and popular conception of hip-hop culture. Hip-hop concerts 
were condemned by the media for random acts of violence and criminal activity that occurred, a 
classic example of paranoia – particularly among law enforcement – about the congregation of 
Black youth in public spaces (Neal 378). The media created criminalized hip-hop concerts to the 
degree that “in the eyes of many suburban whites, hip-hop concerts in places like Long Island’s 
Nassau Coliseum represented a temporary threat to the day-to-day stability of white suburban 
life”(Neal 378). This mainstream perspective undoubtedly increased the exotic allure of hip-hop 
to the white teenage consumers. This surprisingly rapid transmutation of hip-hop culture 
radically changed hip-hop, in subtly racist and disingenuous ways. As Mark Anthony Neal 
explains: 
In less than a decade, hip-hop culture had been transformed from a subculture primarily 
influenced by the responses of black urban youth to postindustrialization into a billion-
dollar industry in which such responses were exploited by corporate capitalist and petit 
bourgeois desires of the black middle class. The latter developments offered little relief to 
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the realities of black urban youth who remained hip-hop’s core constituents, though the 
economic successes of hip-hop artists and the black entrepreneurs associated with 
contemporary black popular music were often used to counter public discussions about 
the negative realities of black urban life. Economic issues aside, corporate control of 
black popular expression, often heightened the contradictions inherent in music produced 
across an economically deprived and racially delimited urban landscape (Neal 381). 
This quote highlights not only the racial element of this cultural shift, but also the class 
dimensions that led to the black middle class playing a role in the transmutation of hip-hop 
culture. With this enormous cultural shift, a mainstream conception of hip-hop had emerged that 
willfully ignored the broader context of the music’s violent and misogynistic content, while 
simultaneously using this controversy as a cog for boosting record sales and creating a new mass 
market of hip-hop consumers. 
 Many critics blame the major record labels and corporations particularly for this 
perpetuation of negative hip-hop stereotypes. One such critic, Jared Ball introduces a number of 
interesting concepts in I Mix What I Like: A Mixtape Manifesto that help to explain the subtle 
tactics often used by corporations to control and create popular culture. Ball views the “Black 
American” struggle as distinct, and more specifically a “Hip-hop nation” that has been 
colonized. This nation has become a distinct entity with a shared history, language, culture and 
territory that meet some basic tenets of nationalism (Ball 22). He uses a theoretical approach 
known as Internal Colonialism theory, which argues that Black America is a distinct entity 
colonized within the United States, with colonialism meaning a “relationship between two (or 
more) racially, ethnically, culturally, and spatially distinct and defined groups between which 
there is an absolute imbalance of power, whereby one determines the ‘social, political, and 
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economic’ condition of the other” (Ball 30). This theory provides the framework for his later 
assertion that the music industry and corporate media are able to take a distinct culture and 
change it dramatically. The political, economic, and cultural power of the media is particularly 
staggering, and there is an undeniable influence that the music industry has within politics, 
simply because of the economic power wielded by a small number of corporations.  
The hip-hop music industry is dominated by four main corporations, which Ball refers to 
as the “Musical OPEC”: Sony, Universal Music Group (UMG), Warner Music Group (WMG), 
and EMI, each of whom are themselves part of larger corporations (Ball 72). These corporations 
wield enormous power, enhanced by the fact that they “have assumed the fourteenth amendment 
right to legal personhood and have become extensions of a shift in need among the ruling class to 
cloak this ‘power elite’ and their ‘invisible class empire’ in anonymity” (Ball 71).  Furthermore, 
these corporations collect between ten and thirty-five million dollars in revenue per year; In 
addition, Sony and UMG combined own eighty to ninety percent of the songs played across 
national radio during any given week (Ball 72). This kind of economic control has a profound 
effect on the creation of culture, and helps to explain how hip-hop culture changed so drastically 
and irrevocably in the late 1980’s. It is also important to realize the repercussions that the 
colonization of the hip-hop nation has for the legal issues surrounding sampling, 
decontextualizing many of hip-hop’s creative practices, and dramatically distorting the outsider, 
mainstream view of hip-hop. An understanding of internal hip-hop culture is clearly necessary 
for making informed legal decisions in sampling cases, and as Ball’s analysis suggests, this 
context of cultural colonization exacerbates the philosophical and semantic gap separating legal 
discourses of sampling ethics from hip-hop’s own internal ethical codes. 
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How Technology Continues to Transform Hip-hop 
 Hip-hop started with turntables and vinyl records. With the advent of digital sampling 
technology the number of deejays and producers skyrocketed, leading to the increased popularity 
of hip-hop, and contributing to the legal troubles arising from more transparency with sampling. 
The proliferation of sampling technology, both hardware and Digital Audio Workstations 
(DAWs) has created a new generation of bedroom producers. These new producers were and are 
aided further by the internet, which has replaced vinyl as the primary way that many producers 
consume and acquire their samples. While the ease of access facilitated by the internet might 
seem on the surface to be beneficial for hip-hop it complicates many purist definitions of 
sampling ethics, which I will explain in depth later in the chapter. In this section I will 
chronologically outline some of the most important technologies that revolutionized hip-hop 
production and performance, specifically recent technological advances that have further 
complicated sampling ethics.  
 The technology that was used to create early rap music was pioneered by deejays who 
used turntables, vinyl records, and mixers in revolutionary ways that helped create certain 
seminal hip-hop aesthetics. The technology also relies on reappropriation and reassignment of 
music technologies (Forman 389). These technologies are generally used in ways for which they 
were not originally intended. For example, the turntable, mixer, and vinyl records were 
manufactured as a way for people to consume music in their own homes. Instead, deejays used 
them as an instrument of production and “rocking a beat between two turntables, aided by 
electronic mixers rebuilt with efficient cross-fade switches” (Forman 390). The turntables were 
used to isolate the breakbeat section of the record, and then that was looped using the turntables 
and the cross-fade switches, allowing for an uninterrupted flow of music. Along with other 
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techniques developed for deejaying, such as scratching and cutting, breakbeats became a core 
aesthetic for hip-hop, which is still prevalent today and would not have developed without the 
use (perhaps more appropriately misuse) of turntables. The effect of these techniques was to 
establish a modern precedent for the way modern producers use digital sampling technology 
(Rose 74). These revolutionary musicians expanded the definition of a deejay from simply 
someone who selects and plays recording on the radio at social function to include 
“performative” deejays and turntablists who manipulated the music in live performance (Katz 
125).  Turntablists still practice many of these now outdated techniques, using the same 
(although more advanced) technology in live performances and “DJ battles”. These turntablists 
have the added benefit of using specialty machines that are specifically designed for use in a hip-
hop setting taking away some of the early do-it-yourself aesthetic (Katz 128). Even their use of 
records is different from the pioneers with special breakbeat compilation discs and battle records 
compiled by better known deejays (Katz 128). Unlike turntablists, modern producers use digital 
sampling technology to reproduce this same aesthetic. 
It wasn’t until 1980’s that newer sampling technology specifically, digital samplers, drum 
machines, and MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) became sufficiently prevalent and 
easy to use that the practice of sampling became more popular with musicians. As with early hip-
hop pioneers’ misuse of turntables and records, producers used samplers and drum machines in 
unintended ways, novel ways that helped further define important aesthetics of hip-hop music 
production. Samplers were originally used as production shortcuts for producers, engineers, and 
composers, adding different musical sections that limited the expense and effort required to bring 
in a studio musician. Furthermore, the samples were most commonly masked when they were 
used to make it more difficult to locate the original (Rose 73). Hip-hop producers were the first 
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to use samplers as the primary means of composition, “using samples as a point of reference, as a 
means by which the process of repetition and recontextualization can be highlighted and 
privileged”(Rose 73). The rise of the digital sampler progressed with the introduction of two 
marquee instruments: the E-mu SP-12 and the Roland TR-808. The less expensive of the two 
was the E-mu SP-12, which was the first sampler intended to allow a producer to create rhythm 
tracks from individual drum hits (Schloss 35). Producers further expanded the use of these 
devices by also using the SP-12 to sample entire melodies, a technique pioneered by the producer 
Marley Marl (Schloss 35). The TR-808 is arguably the single most recognizable drum machine 
within hip-hop, and its classic deep kick bass drum, handclap sounds, snare and hi-hats are 
instantly recognizable sonic aesthetics within the genre (Rose 75). However, the rigidity of drum 
machines requires producers to differentiate themselves from other producers in non-traditional 
ways. It is more difficult for the hip-hop outsider to hear the subtleties that separate different 
producers’ styles because of the predominant use of a relatively small number of samplers. If 
digital samplers and drum machines became popular, it was due just as much to their decrease in 
price as well as their ease of use. Along with the synthesizer, MIDI is widely regarded as one of 
the most important technological advances made in making electronic music (Theberge 74). 
MIDI was seen initially as a way to upgrade compatibility issues between synthesizer and drum 
machines. The introduction of MIDI contributed to increased compatibility between instruments 
by different manufacturers (Theberge 89). 
In our contemporary moment, the prevalence of personal computers, and the increased 
ease of access to samples through the internet has created a new subculture of bedroom 
producers who have different perceptions of what it takes to be a legitimate producer. The 
internet has completely revolutionized the way in which many people share, consume and create 
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music. Paul Miller a/k/a DJ Spooky the Subliminal Kid argues that the internet represents a “kind 
of legacy of the way that DJs look for information – it’s a shareware world on the Web, and the 
migration of cultural values from one street to another” (In Through the Out Door 14). This idea 
obviously evokes the crate digging roots of early deejay culture, and Miller further expands the 
idea by introducing the concept of a “Semantic Web” describing a new type of hierarchy and 
standardization of an immense repository of information that is always accessible (In Through 
the Out Door 15). This ease of access has only further complicated the legal issues surrounding 
hip-hop, and copyright has reacted by only getting stricter and seeking to restrict this seemingly 
limitless access that has helped hip-hop continue to grow in new and increasingly interesting 
ways. 
Rap producers are at the forefront of popular musicians who occupy an increasingly 
liminal space, actively consuming and using samples to create their own music, blurring the 
traditional distinction between composer and listener. They are not solely composers, but 
consumers as well: 
Digital musical instruments are hybrid devices: when one plays (or programs) a drum 
machine, synthesizer, or sampler, one is not only engaged in the production of sound and 
melodic or rhythmic patterns but in their technical reproduction as well. Popular 
musicians who use new technologies are not simply the producers of prerecorded patterns 
of sounds (music) consumed by particular audiences; they, too, are consumers – 
consumers of technology, consumers of prerecorded sounds and patters of sounds that 
they rework transform, and arrange into new patterns (Theberge 2-3). 
In the edited collection Technoculture and Music, editors Rene Lysloff and Leslie Gay lay out 
their definition of technoculture, which is a useful prelude to my discussion of issues authenticity 
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and of hip-hop’s internal ethical code for sampling. Technoculture “refers to communities and 
forms of cultural practice that have emerged in response to changing media and  information 
technologies, forms characterized by technological adaptation, avoidance, subversion, or 
resistance” (Lysloff 2). Essentially, technoculture is an attempt to overcome the distinction and 
ultimately imagined conflict between technology and music. The claim that technology corrupts 
music composition – with machines becoming surrogate composers for those lacking “real” 
musical ability – is an antiquated and fallacious argument. While it is true that some composers 
use music technology as a crutch, it also changes the way that musicians compose, creating new 
creative processes previously unavailable for musicians. Rap producers’ use and misuse of 
technology has always been an easy target for detractors who decry the lack of “authenticity” in 
their compositional processes, as well as the absence of formal musical instrument among certain 
producers. However, musical authenticity is not an easily definable concept. 
Determining Authorship: Is Hip-hop Original? 
 Authenticity is an incredibly problematic term for both hip-hop artists and their critics. 
The artists have an intimate knowledge of the musical beginnings of hip-hop and there is an 
internal divide within hip-hop between purists, who identify more with the aesthetics of early 
hip-hop, and those who seek to rewrite the rules. Critics argue that sampling constitutes theft, 
and is not an authentic or original form of authorship. Digital sampling and electronic music 
composition has challenged many normative assumptions regarding compositional originality 
and authenticity, blurring an already opaque definition. Originality and authenticity are at the 
heart of the debate over the ethics of sampling, and undoubtedly the criticisms directed towards 
sampling have contributed to judges’ decision making on cases that have unseen widespread 
impact on creative practices within the rap music industry. Even before many momentous 
20 
 
 
decisions changed the sampling culture within hip-hop, many law review articles were written 
about the threat that sampling posed for the future place of “live musicians” and the more general 
impact on more “authentic” composers (Schumacher 447). One problematic area of copyright 
law is the legal definition of artistic originality, which is diametrically opposed to originality in 
hip-hop. Even more problematic is the legal definition of authorship, because “authorship can 
now be assigned to corporate entities instead of artists, and even though originality has come to 
mean origination…copyright is still influenced by the ideological construct of ‘author’ as a 
singular ‘origin’ of artistic works (Schumacher 447). The legal world must expand their 
definition and incorporate what these concepts mean within hip-hop to better protect the rights of 
musicians.  
 With respect to production, the insider discussion of authenticity is central to many 
producers personal set of ethics that guide their own composing. While there has been an 
enormous amount of literature written about the concept of authenticity in relation to lyrics, 
Joseph Schloss outlines some key terms to understand when considering authenticity in relation 
to production. Using the interviews he conducted with numerous hip-hop producers, Schloss 
argues that “producers have developed an approach to authenticity that is characterized by a sort 
of aesthetic purism; certain musical gestures are valued for aesthetic reasons, and one’s 
adherence to this aesthetic confers authenticity”.  The most crucial part of this quote is the idea 
of  “aesthetic purism” since, as Schloss notes, he wants to distinguish purism as it relates to other 
aspects of hip-hop culture such as ethnicity and class and to emphasize the importance that 
abstract ideas of beauty play for aesthetic purism. One issue with this is how aesthetic purism 
can clear up issues surrounding authorship. If the only qualifier determining creational 
“authenticity” as Schloss defines it is adherence to these relatively subjective, highly abstract 
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principles, then how is someone unfamiliar with hip-hop, for example a judge, supposed to 
unequivocally determine that the use of a certain sample is lawful? Furthermore, aesthetic purism 
is presented as a coherent definition that is broadly applicable; however, music is inherently 
subjective, and while there are certainly aesthetic qualities within hip-hop that are universally 
recognized as “beautiful”, does that make it ethical for a sample to be deemed inauthentic simply 
because it is not “beautiful”. While there are no clear answers to these difficult questions, they 
will be important to keep in mind as I further explain Schloss’s definition of sampling ethics, and 
more importantly, how his definition could be applied to the legal world, so that copyright law 
can truly protect artists’ individual writes as authors and creators. 
Hip-hop Sampling Ethics 
 Incorporating these central ideas of authorship and originality within hip-hop, in this 
section I will introduce Joseph Schloss’s overview of internal sampling ethics from his 
ethnography Making Beats. In the book, Schloss interviews multiple hip-hop producers to 
discuss their own approaches to sampling, focusing on their aesthetic and moral goals. While the 
discussion is incredibly useful, many of the producers fall into what one might call the purist 
category of hip-hop producers. Moreover, because the book was written over the course of ten 
years and released in 2004, the discussion is perhaps somewhat out of date and, although no fault 
of Schloss, does not reflect the transformative effect that the internet has had on sampling. In 
addition to Schloss, I have supplemented my definition with more current discussions as well as 
my own personal explorations into hip-hop producing.  
 The concepts of originality, authorship, and authenticity are incredibly important to 
internal sampling ethics as it relates to the law, however Schloss is concerned with producers’ 
ethics regarding “strategies” towards sampling as opposed to the whether the practice of 
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sampling is ethical (Schloss 101). While this may at first make the usefulness of his definition 
questionable, it is necessary to understand that for hip-hop insiders the ethics of sampling are not 
up for debate. For these producers, sampling is the musical foundation of hip-hop, and the set of 
insider ethics that Schloss presents help the outsider better understand the nuances, but more 
importantly appreciate the incredible artistry that goes into sampling. The amount of thought that 
goes into the sampling ethics of the producers he interviews indicates just how important the 
practice is to them personally. In addition, a more intimate understanding of the ethical standards 
that producers follow will allow hip-hop outsiders to contextualize different uses of sampling. In 
addition, the rules that Schloss introduces help to show that even though the ethics are somewhat 
subjective, there is a clear cohesiveness. The simple act of crate digging is one of the single most 
important elements of sampling for the producers in Schloss’s ethnography, and serves a number 
of other purposes besides simply being the sample source, such as manifesting ties to the hip-hop 
deejaying tradition, “paying dues”, educating producers about various forms of music, and 
serving as a form of socialization between producers (Schloss 79). Hip-hop sampling ethics are 
also indebted to the legacy of collective authorship that characterizes African diasporic musical 
practices, a theme that I will discuss in later chapters. Clearly, sampling is inseparable from hip-
hop, and needs to be legitimately recognized by the law as well. The argument that Schloss gives 
builds a strong foundation for a clear definition of internal sampling ethics that can address the 
issues that arise within copyright. 
 The first important point to note about internal sampling ethics is the unbreakable 
connection between ethics and aesthetics. Many of the rules that Schloss introduces originated 
because producers agree that those certain production techniques make hip-hop music “better”. 
These rules also originate from the purist hip-hop producers perspective, and there are certainly 
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some popular producers that violate these ethics. In fact, hip-hop producers effectively police 
themselves within the community, since for purists, the ethics are one of the major tools of 
preserving the essence of hip-hop; producers will even create new rule for themselves in order to 
maintain the quasi-religious character of sampling ethics (Schloss 104). Schloss introduces six 
foundational rules of sampling ethics, each of which I will address separately and modify where 
necessary: One, No Biting: one can’t sample material that has been recently used by someone 
else; Two, records are the only legitimate source for sampled material; Three, one cannot sample 
from other hip-hop records; Four, one cannot sample records one respects; Five, one cannot 
sample from reissues of compilation recordings of songs with good beats; and Six, one cannot 
sample more than one part of a given record. 
The first rule is deals indirectly with the concept of originality. “Biting”, as understood 
within hip-hop, is a term that “refers pejoratively to the appropriation of intellectual material 
from other hip-hop artists. Generally speaking, it does not apply to the appropriation of material 
from outside the hip-hop community” (Schloss 106). Schloss also introduces three other 
production-oriented definitions that are important for this rule: “flipping” which refers to 
creatively and substantially altering material, “chopping” which is the alteration of a sampled 
phrase by dividing it into smaller segments and reordering, and “looping” which refers to 
sampling a longer phrase and repeating it with little or no alteration (Schloss 106). These three 
techniques are important for producers, and mastery of these techniques is necessary to be a 
respected producer within the hip-hop community. It is exactly the same as learning technique 
for any other more “traditional” musical instrument, and helps to give each producer their own 
unique style. There are however three exceptions to the no biting rule. If one flips the sample, if 
one is specifically parodying the other known usage, or if the bite is unintentional, then it does 
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not violate the rule. Interestingly enough, all three of these exceptions have analogous arguments 
within the legal world, and all three have been used to defend the use of a sample in a courtroom, 
which I will discuss more in chapter 3. This rule highlights the importance that producers place 
on creativity, and each producer must be able to differentiate his style from other hip-hop 
producers, while remaining firmly within the hip-hop production aesthetic. 
 The second rule – records are the only legitimate source of samples – is one that needs to 
be modified slightly, since as I explained earlier, technology in recent years has transformed the 
way in which people consume music, and certainly producers are no exception. However, the 
aesthetic elements of records, the scratchy, often softer, mellower sound, are still idealized by 
hip-hop purists. There are still many modern producers that use records and have enormous 
record collections from years of extensive crate digging. As Schloss notes, there is also a 
practical connection to vinyl records, since many producers start out as deejays and already have 
easy access to vinyl records (Schloss 109). Using vinyl is also seen by many producers as a way 
of paying dues, and they are committed to the “idea of tradition” (Schloss 109). However, it is 
becoming increasingly expensive and unrealistic for many, more casual producers to maintain 
large record collections, and the internet is a vast resource of virtually any sound one could 
imagine to sample. With the ubiquity of file-sharing networks it is incredibly easy for a producer 
to hear sample and instantaneously find it on the internet, download and be able to sample it. 
 The third rule – one cannot sample from other hip-hop records – reinforces similar ideals 
as the second rule, defining strict parameters for where a producer can find samples. This rule 
also illuminates the importance of differentiating yourself from other producers. Crate digging is 
incredibly important for producers because it allows them to impress their peers with the 
obscurity of their samples, and the unique ways in which they can combine seemingly disparate 
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sounds. However, not all producers strictly adhere to the third rule. As Schloss notes, some 
producers have admitted to sampling individual drum hits from certain hip-hop records (Schloss 
116). One of the producers that Schloss profiles, Domino, feels that ethics related to crate 
digging have become obsolete, citing the popularity of breakbeat compilation records (Schloss 
116-117). While I agree with Domino that traditional crate digging is dead, as a direct result of 
the decline in the number of record stores and the cultural centrality of the internet, I do not think 
it necessarily means that the ethic is obsolete. The ethics of crate digging for hip-hop producers 
is centered on finding an obscure record that illustrates both a producer’s musical taste, and their 
willingness to spend hours searching for the right sample. This is an area that I will explore more 
in-depth later, focusing on how technology has revolutionized the practice of crate digging 
 The fourth and fifth rules (one cannot sample records one respects and one cannot sample 
from reissues of compilation recordings of songs with good beats) are very similar to each other, 
and so I will address the two of them together. Schloss explains that the fourth rule rests on three 
pillars: that sampling may be disrespectful to a great artist, that some music is so good that 
sampling does not improve it, and that sampling something that good is not enough of a musical 
challenge. The fifth rule ties in directly to the last pillar of the fourth rule, and is an incredibly 
important part of sampling ethics for producers. One of the most important and recognizable 
aspects for listeners in appreciating any form of music is very often the skill that shows through, 
whether it be the incredible range of a singer, or the clarity and precision with which a pianist is 
able to play an incredibly fast, difficult passage. This is very often one of the most easily 
recognizable indicators of the amount of practice and dedication it takes for any form of music-
making, and it is especially important for hip-hop sampling. The easiness of sampling is one of 
the most common criticisms leveled at hip-hop producers by their detractors, and these rules 
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address this criticism by creating an internal ethical standard that scorns any sort of sampling 
shortcut. 
 The sixth rule – one cannot sample more than one part of a given record –  continues a 
common theme through these rules that reinforces the idea that sampling should not be easy, and 
that producers must constantly challenge themselves. It also recalls ideas about creativity and 
originality that were expressed in earlier rules. Schloss explains that one of the aesthetic 
rationales behind this rule is that much of the artistry from sampling often comes from the 
blending of two samples that one wouldn’t necessarily put together, and by sampling from the 
same record one does not have to worry about whether or not they sound good together, since 
they presumably already do (Schloss 130). Furthermore, this rule reinforces a collective sense 
within hip-hop culture that each producer must value the code of ethics, and that material effort, 
hard work, intellectual effort and creativity are incredibly important within hip-hop. One other 
important point that Schloss makes is that adherence to these principles is not enough to be 
respected within the community, and “the acceptance of one’s musical peers requires a keen 
grasp of a more abstract and malleable set of standards, of what might be termed ‘aesthetic 
expectations’ – collective ideas about what sounds good” (Schloss 132).  
 I am a relative newcomer to hip-hop culture, and have only recently begun producing my 
own beats using FL Studio 11, one of the more popular Digital Audio Workstations, as well as 
an Akai MPK 25. I mention my own involvement because as I have become more accustomed to 
the composition techniques of producers, I have encountered some ethical dilemmas in my quest 
for samples. When I first began experimenting with the software and keyboard, I had only the 
stock instruments and sounds that come pre-loaded with the software. Every attempt I made to 
create even a simple loop ended in frustration that led me to search for more sounds. I soon 
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discovered that there was an overwhelming amount of material available for free in the form of 
breakbeat compilations, beat packs of popular producers, and songs that were sampled often 
within hip-hop. I was amazed by how easily I could throw a simple four bar loop together that 
sounded nearly professional. Once I began reading Schloss’s book, specifically the section on 
sampling ethics, I felt incredibly guilty about what I had done. While my musical pursuit is 
purely for my own enjoyment, I couldn’t help but feel like any track I made with these samples 
would be inauthentic from the perspective of the hip-hop community. Most of the producers that 
Schloss interviewed in his ethnography undoubtedly spent countless hours digging through 
crates of records, and even more time in the studio perfecting the sound of each individual drum 
hit, instrument sound, or unique sample that helps to create each producers individual style. In a 
matter of hours I had accumulated an overwhelmingly vast array of unique samples. This is a 
classic example of one of the tenets of Sampling Ethics in Making Beats: biting. This is one of 
the worst offenses a producer can make in the eyes of many old-school producers. My own songs 
sounded better because I was reappropriating samples that have already been used in hip-hop, 
and are wholly sonically unoriginal. I initially did not expect the production learning curve to be 
so steep. As a musically literate person who has studied music theory extensively and played the 
piano for over ten years, I feel truly humbled. It helped me further realize how rich and 
demanding the artistic craft of the hip-hop producer is which gave me invaluable perspective on 
the arguments decrying the unoriginality in sampling that dominate legal discourse. 
 Hopefully, this chapter helped to illuminate the perspective of hip hop’s musical insiders, 
particularly insider issues regarding sampling, the rich and long tradition of hip-hop, and the 
myopic view of hip-hop perpetuated by popular media and reinforced by the record companies. 
Sampling is clearly and unequivocally a rich and challenging musical legacy that deserves to be 
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treated as such. The internal ethics that I have explored in this chapter will help in applying a 
corrective lens towards the legal conceptions of sampling ethics, devised without regard to hip-
hop culture’s creative dynamics. However, as will be explained later, law has a much more 
difficult job since the often abstract discussion within hip-hop regarding ethics must be made 
into a much more concrete set of definitions and rules, so that copyright can truly protect the 
rights of the artists. Moving towards the next chapter dealing specifically with the history and 
nuances of copyright law, hopefully these arguments will help us to keep in view the ideas of 
authorship, originality, and authenticity specific to hip hop, because of the central space these 
same ideas occupy within the ethical logic of copyright law. 
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Chapter 2: The Development of United States Copyright Law 
In this chapter, I will highlight the salient features of the United States Copyright Law 
that directly apply to the practice of sampling. Before explaining the minutiae of current 
copyright law, it is important to grasp the slow, methodical process by which the law changes. 
Copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device” (17 U.S.C. Sec. 
102.a). Hip-hop is firmly within a tradition of collective authorship in African diasporic culture, 
a concept which is in some ways diametrically opposed to the legal conception of authorship. In 
addition to challenging conceptions of authorship, hip-hop sampling practices also challenge 
normative legal assumptions about originality and creativity. Copyright law seeks to protect the 
rights of the artists, but it has increasingly restricted the creative rights of hip-hop producers. 
Hip-hop’s internal code of sampling ethics that I introduced in chapter 1 contain many useful 
concepts that copyright law could possibly  incorporate in a way that substantively changes legal 
assumptions about authorship, originality, and authenticity. Copyright law contains a significant 
legal grey area, which sampling cases have made painfully clear. Another contributing factor is 
the glacial pace at which the law progresses, evidenced by the fact that the 1909 Copyright Act 
still has an important effect on the way the law views certain types of technology. For this 
reason, it is necessary to explain the history of copyright law, starting with the Copyright Act of 
1909, then the Copyright Act of 1976 – the main source of current copyright law – and finally, 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 which was a direct reaction to the transformative 
effect the internet had on music consumption. It is also important to note that the history of 
copyright in the United States draws heavily from western philosophical notions, and especially 
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the legal system in England. Copyright law, as of yet, has been unable to accommodate for 
sampling, and until significant changes are made the rights of hip-hop artists continue to be 
restricted. First, it is important to understand the purpose and scope of copyright law. 
Purpose of Copyright Law 
 The justification for copyright law comes from Article 1, section 8 of the United States 
constitution which states that congress shall have the power to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”(US Cons, art. I sec. 8). There are two justifications 
for copyright law that directly come from this quote. First, copyright is intended to promote the 
arts, and second, it should provide authors with the exclusive rights to reproduce and profit from  
their respective creations for a limited time. Legal scholar and copyright expert William Patry 
poses two questions about these somewhat vague justifications; “First, what is the purpose of 
copyright? Second, to whom should benefits be granted?” (Patry 907). While it would seem 
logical to assume that the single most important goal of copyright is to protect the rights of the 
author, this has not been the case throughout copyright’s history.  Patry explains that “copyright 
legislation usually has been enacted in response to interest group pressures…and more recently, 
there has been congressional inattention to serious divergences between rhetoric and reality, 
resulting in laws that bear little relationship to the objectives espoused at the time of passage” 
(Patry 907). This quote is emblematic of guiding themes throughout his book, How to Fix 
Copyright, which identifies three justifications for copyright law that policymakers (i.e. 
Congress) favor: One, copyright law should provide incentives for authors to create works they 
would not create in the absence of that incentive; Two, it should provide that the public has 
access to those works; Three, it should provide respect, via non-economic rights, for those who 
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create cultural works (Patry, 75).  The first justification is the most relevant to the discussion of 
copyright in this thesis. Essentially, the first justification argues that copyright laws exist to 
promote creativity. The argument claims that, but for copyright laws, artists would not have 
incentive to create, and overall cultural creativity would remain stagnant. This is a highly 
contentious claim which I will address more specifically later in the chapter. Even more 
contentious is policymakers’ claims that it is possible to impose all three of these goals at once. 
As Patry explains: 
this assertion is based on the unproven and implausible idea that there are people sitting 
around either doing nothing or doing something else, and that once a new, stronger law is 
passed, they will automatically switch to producing copyrighted works.  Another version 
of this idea is that people are producing some works but if the laws were stronger they 
would produce more (Patry, 78). 
The justification for copyright law, in this case stronger laws, is one of the fundamental 
philosophical questions within the legal discourse of copyright law. It is interesting to consider 
how more restrictive copyright law would affect hip-hop producers. If a law was introduced that 
provided more specific guidelines for sampling without licensing, would that increase the 
creativity of hip-hop producers? It would obviously provide judges with an explicit statute to 
reference in sampling cases, and it could also benefit producers by clearly outlining what type of 
sampling is legally permissible. These are all questions to keep in mind throughout this chapter.  
Scope of Copyright Law 
The first chapter of U.S. Copyright codified law explicitly defines a number of significant 
terms, and more importantly sets definitive guidelines that help to explain what types of works 
are protected. Copyright exists in order to protect : 
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original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of 
authorship include the following categories: 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(7) sound recordings; ( 17 U.S.C. sec. 102.a) 
I included only the types of relevant works that are protected. The first sentence introduces one 
of the central issues within copyright. What exactly constitutes an “original work of authorship” 
and what guidelines should be used to define the terms? The ambiguity of this language is 
problematic, and is an area where revision should be considered in order to provide better 
guidelines for decision-making in copyright cases. Interestingly, musical works, which I will 
refer to as compositions, are separate from sound recordings and have different legal definitions. 
A composition is “an original work consisting of musical material (some combination of melody, 
harmony, and rhythm). Lyrics to nondramatic musical works are included in the composition 
copyright”, while a sound recording is “any work in which musical, spoken, or other sounds are 
fixated onto any medium (including sounds accompanying films)” (Demers 22). There are two 
very important differences between these compositions and sound recordings. First, most record 
companies require control of a sound recording as well as the composition many times as a 
condition for release of the work; However, if the composition is self-released then the author 
owns the copyright (Demers 22). Second, sound recordings and compositions have different sets 
of guidelines for derivative works, often called mechanical reproductions (Demers 22). For 
compositions, mechanical reproductions are covered under a compulsory license allowing 
anyone who sends written notice to the Copyright Office and pays the royalty rate on each record 
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made and distributed. Sound recordings are not covered under the same compulsory license, 
meaning that the license must be negotiated before the recording is appropriated into a new work 
(Demers 22). This legal distinction was first defined under the 1909 Copyright act, reacting to 
recent advances in sound recording technology and the implications for music copyright holders.  
Copyright Act of 1909 
The Copyright Act of 1909 was enacted in reaction to the Supreme Court case White-
Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company. This case dealt with the infringement of 
the copyrights of two different musical composition published originally as sheet music entitled, 
“Little Cotton Dolly”, and “Kentucky Babe” by Adam Geibel. The defendant was a proprietor of 
player pianos known as the “Apollo”, which used the fairly recent technology of perforated rolls 
of music that when used with the instrument can reproduce the authored work. The appellant 
argued that under the copyright act, he had all of the rights to any actions involving the 
reproduction of his work because he is the author. The central question considered was whether 
or not the piano rolls constituted copies of the composer’s work. This case was one of the first 
that dealt with the impact of technology on the production and distribution of music.  Justice 
Day, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, asserted that since perforated rolls are a 
mechanical invention and are completely illegible to musicians, then they are not covered by the 
copyright act. He wrote that the “ordinary signification of the words ‘copying’, ‘publishing’ etc., 
cannot be stretched to include it [perforated rolls]”. He also referenced a case in the English 
courts that dealt with the same issue and noted that “these perforated rolls did not infringe the 
English Copyright Act protecting sheets of music” (White Smith Music v. Apollo Co.). 
This case had unintended consequences for future musical practices, foreshadowing the 
increasing issues that copyright began to deal with as a result of technological advances. The 
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Supreme Court’s decision also introduced the concept of mechanical licensing, originally called 
the “cover license” in the 1909 act (Demers 37). Immediately following this decision, Congress 
passed the Copyright Act of 1909 in direct response to the White-Smith decision, which 
highlighted the importance of making sure the author’s rights extended beyond the reproduction 
of the sheet music (Demers 37). Under this act, the composer of a work was granted exclusive 
rights to the first mechanical reproduction of his/her piece (Copyright Act of 1909). However, 
once this right had been exercised, anyone else was allowed to make a reproduction as long as 
the composer received certain royalties (Copyright Act of 1909). The White-Smith case also 
revealed the economic motivations behind music copyright law. A composer’s economic rights 
are a central concern of copyright law, and there are large property interests touching on the 
rights of the musician and the publisher in this case.  
Although the 1909 act was meant to increase protection of artists’ rights, it favored the 
manufacturer of piano rolls who benefited directly from the copies of the composition.  This 
trend continued with respect to licensing, contributing to the staggering decline of the sheet 
music industry (Demers 38). Copyright law’s protection for the music industry’s economic rights 
is even true with sampling, especially because of popular negative connotations of hip-hop 
culture, specifically that sampling is derivative, and therefore unoriginal. As author Kembrew 
Mcleod notes:   
Notions of originality and authorship are deeply embedded in capitalist relations. 
Copyright is a culturally bound law that could not deal with the collision of a particular 
form of cultural production rooted in the European practice of notating music and the 
more improvisatory African-American tradition of Jazz. Just as copyright law did not 
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know how to deal with jazz artists’ appropriation of certain phrases and whole choruses 
from popular songs, copyright law still has not come to terms with sampling (Mcleod 77). 
These issues highlight the concepts that occupy the philosophical distance between copyright and 
sampling, and in a broader sense many forms of black music. The philosophical impact of this 
1909 act manifested itself in significant changes made to Copyright law in the form of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.   
Copyright Act of 1976 
 The Copyright Act of 1976 is the most recent instance of significant revision made to the 
codified law. It made a number of important additions and revisions prompted by the 
proliferation of new sound recording technologies which revolutionized the music industry’s 
ability to distribute sound recordings to consumers. The substantive changes that the Copyright 
Act of 1976 introduced have proven fundamental to modern copyright law, especially when the 
laws have been applied in hip-hop sampling court cases. This law introduced a number of 
important changes, updating the definitions of the types of works protected as explained earlier 
in the chapter, the exclusive rights of the copyright holder, copyright duration, and most 
importantly instituting the fair use doctrine. 
 Much like the Copyright Act of 1909 before it, The Copyright Act of 1976, was a 
reaction to remarkable technological advances in the field of sound recording. Many of the 
sections that were revised or added to the existing body of law were instituted in order to deal 
with the potential problems that new technology posed for copyright holders. One of the most 
important changes extended the duration of copyright. For all works created on or after January 
1, 1978, protection begins the moment the work is fixed in a form of tangible expression and 
lasts for seventy years; Before this, the author had the option to extend the copyright in its 
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twenty-eighth year (Demers 21). If the work is anonymous, or of corporate authorship, that 
length skyrockets to ninety five years from its publication, or one hundred and twenty years from 
its creation, whichever comes first. Clearly, part of the reason for this change in the law arose 
from the burgeoning market of technical sound recordings (records, tape cassettes, CDs etc.) and 
their significant economic value. It was not until the Sound Recording Act of 1971 that copyright 
protection was extended to all sound recordings regardless of the medium on which they were 
fixed; The Copyright Act of 1976 took this a step further by markedly increasing the length of 
copyright protection for author’s works (Demers 23).  The increase in copyright length had a 
seismic effect on copyright culture, and reflected the enormous influence corporations have  had 
on policy-making. It is also a significant turning point in copyright’s historical development. The 
law evolved from a limited set of rules governing only books to a “source of generalized 
protection for a class of newly valuable market commodities: ‘works’” (Aufderheide 36). The 
Copyright Act of 1976 has been described as a marked shift away from the regulatory approach 
to copyright, towards one based purely on property rights (Aufderheide 36). The regulatory 
approach towards copyright was characterized by a “limited set of rules governing only books” 
while the Copyright Act of 1976 “reflected the interest of the major media corporations” and 
their desire to protect their economic rights(Aufderheide 36). An important legal concept that 
contributed to the shift towards protecting corporations’ property rights is corporate authorship, a 
concept which I will explore more in-depth later in this chapter.  
 The most important and influential measure that was instituted by the Copyright act of 
1976 was the doctrine of fair use, contained within section 107, with four factors to be 
considered in determining whether or not a particular use is fair: 
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1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes 
2. The nature of the copyrighted work 
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole 
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted 
work (The Copyright Act of 1976). 
Scholars have simplified fair use, presenting two distinct iterations. One use is an individual’s 
own personal use of copyrighted material (i.e. no monetary benefits are received); The second 
use is the reuse of copyrighted material in the process of making something else, sometimes 
referred to as “productive” fair use (Demers 18-19). While the second type of fair use is 
especially relevant in the context of sampling, the first type is also incredibly important because 
of the explosion of digital culture, with some content industries arguing that private fair use does 
not exist anymore on the internet (Demers 19). For example, it is unclear whether an individual 
would be protected by fair use if they were to release a mash-up – especially if it combined 
multiple popular songs – through a social media website for free. The second type of fair use is 
one that has been fairly restricted by court decisions, and is one of the areas that I will discuss 
more in depth later as a possible change that could be made to copyright law.  
An expansion of the second, productive type of fair use would undoubtedly ease the 
concerns of the countless musicians and remix artists operating in numerous mediums, who 
would be able to produce and share a substantial amount of material over the internet. 
Furthermore, this type of fair use encourages participatory collective culture, while “copyright 
today heavily emphasizes individual authors, individual works, and the notion that creativity is 
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an individual act – a notion that only emerged recently” (Aufderheide 20). Collaborative culture 
is already the dominant form in many digital mediums, with online video platforms, blogs, and 
other web pages full of spontaneous, collective cultural expression done for the love of art 
(Aufderheide 21). Fair use is an important part of our modern copyright law, demarcating space 
within copyright law in which artists can legally create art using other people’s intellectual 
property. Its complex historical development helps demystify some of the more seemingly 
arcane traditions embedded within the law. I will discuss the history of fair use more in depth 
later, since it ties in directly to the three central legal concepts, originality, creativity, and 
authorship. First, it is important to highlight some of the more recent changes made to copyright 
law. 
 The cultural influence of the internet irreversibly transformed popular consumption and 
creation in ways that increasingly challenge copyright law. Traditional copyright law based on 
the protection of tangible works becomes much more complex in the digital age, where the 
concept of a work becomes more abstract. Corporate providers of copyrighted material are 
particularly concerned by some aspects of internet culture, despite the economic opportunities it 
presents by allowing them to directly interact with consumers. One of the main changes made to 
copyright law was the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) which “provides civil 
and criminal remedies against those who circumvent technological safeguards and tamper with 
copyright management information” (Leaffer sec. 1.09b). The influence of the internet with 
regard to cultural consumption has boldly underlined the difficulty associated with building upon 
previous legal concepts. Technology changes much more rapidly than the law could ever 
possibly keep up with. Inevitably, new technology will continue to cause unforeseen difficulties, 
complicating the present as well as future law.  
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The Evolution of Authorship, Ownership, and Originality 
The legal concepts authorship, ownership, and originality are markedly different from 
their colloquial definitions. However, it is the purpose of the law to define these concepts 
explicitly, so that they can be directly applied to situations where issues of authorship, 
ownership, and originality arise. While my previous discussion of the history of copyright law 
was limited to American copyright, these three concepts are embedded within some of the 
earliest identifiable forms of copyright that developed over the course of hundreds of years in 
Europe. The evolution of copyright in Europe also illustrates the influence that property laws 
have had on these three concepts, concepts which are continually challenged as the tangibility of 
copyrighted works becomes increasingly abstract. The influence of the history of property law on 
intellectual property is a central concern of this thesis, one that I will address more in-depth in 
chapter four. In this section, I will give a brief overview of the history of copyright in Europe, 
focusing specifically on early legal documents that dealt with intellectual property, as well as 
some philosophical works that dealt with the issues of authorship and ownership in the realm of 
cultural expression. 
Conceptions of intellectual property rights can be traced back as far ancient Greece, 
ancient Jewish law, and the Roman publishing system (Bettig 11). Interestingly, the Greeks’ own 
conceptions of Intellectual property seem much more modern when compared to United States 
copyright law. The Ancient Greeks’ oral culture, producing works of epic poetry, such as the 
works of Homer, and the lack of a written culture in Ancient Greece have complicated  the 
recording claims of authorship, although claims of individual ownership may not have been 
made in the first place since the poets saw their work as a collective achievement (Bettig 11). In 
the Hebrew Talmud, the oral reporters were required to identify contributors of a new principle, 
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signaling “something akin to an author’s moral right to attribution” (Bettig 12). The dominance 
of oral culture in ancient societies makes it difficult to locate clear instances of early conceptions 
of intellectual property. It was not until the invention of the printing press that any clear 
beginning to copyright law can clearly be identified. 
The effect of the printing press on the dissemination of written work is rivaled perhaps 
only by the Internet. Invented in 1476 by Englishman William Caxton, the printing press was 
seen by publishers as a considerable economic opportunity, while the Crown was concerned with 
the dissemination of works advocating religious heresy, and controversial political ideas (Leaffer 
2). A number of statutes and decrees were enacted in response, most famously the first Copyright 
Act, The Statute of  Queen Anne, passed in 1710 (Leaffer Sec. 102). Most notably, the Statute 
rewarded authors for their creations, while also recognizing public domain, by limiting the 
number of years an author has rights (Leaffer Sec. 102). Important to note as well is that this Act 
concerned the right to copy , and nothing else, and was aimed at providing order for the book 
industry and preventing monopoly (Bettig 23). This signaled an important ideological 
transformation in English society at the time. Initially, writing was viewed as a leisurely pursuit, 
but after centuries of printing, compensation for publishing became a legitimate and sometimes 
lucrative career (Bettig 18). Clearly, written culture required a different definition of authorship. 
The concept of collective authorship that pervaded oral culture did not carry over to written 
culture. More specifically, the inalienable, natural right of the copyright holder to publish, and 
copy their work was central to the early conception of copyright law in Europe. United States 
Copyright law descends directly from this tradition. Between 1783 and 1786, twelve of the 
thirteen original colonies passed copyright laws; All of these laws were generally based on the 
language and structure of the Statute of Queen Anne (Bettig 24). The first United States federal 
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copyright act was enacted May 31, 1790 and was structured after the Statute of Queen Anne 
(Bettig 26).  
There are many western philosophers whose writings are particularly germane to the 
discussion of copyright, although the work of John Locke and G.W.F. Hegel. There are two 
competing narratives that emerge from their respective writings. John Locke was an influential 
eighteenth century British philosopher whose writings about natural law and the natural rights of 
man were, and remain influential on legal and political scholarship. The most applicable concept 
of Locke’s in the context of copyright law is the natural rights theory, which focuses on the 
author as an individual who morally deserves to be compensated for their work. More 
specifically, the moral rights of an author to see rewards for their creations based on their 
contribution to society is one of the central tenets of Locke’s natural rights of man(Leaffer Sec. 
107b). While it is noted that Locke’s writings about the natural rights of man had minimal 
impact on the passage of the Statue of Queen Anne, his “emphasis on ‘authorship’ and ‘authors’ 
rights’ provided the primary ideological justification for the recognition of new legal interest in 
literary and artistic creations” (Leaffer Sec. 107b). Locke’s natural laws, and especially his 
natural laws of man are still a central part of copyright jurisprudence rhetoric, evidenced by the 
commonly held assumption that an author has a right to receive monetary compensation for their 
artistic work. However, there are some issues that arise in the application of  Lockean concepts 
to copyright, specifically how much control an author should have, and how long that control 
should last (Leaffer Sec. 107.b). 
The second influential school of philosophical thought relating to copyright law comes 
from the German philosopher Hegel, and his theory of moral rights, also known as the 
personality model. Essentially, this theory posits the idea that “property provides a means for 
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self-actualization, for personal expression, and for the dignity of the individual” (Leaffer Sec. 
107c). This theory of personality rights is found in some parts of the Berne convention – an 
international agreement governing copyright that was adopted by the United States in section 
106A of the Copyright Act of 1976 – that specifically mentions an author’s rights of integrity 
and attribution (Leaffer Sec. 107c). The theories of Locke and Hegel have been incredibly 
influential in the history of Anglo-American copyright law, and have been successfully deployed 
to explain or justify expansions or revisions of the scope of copyright law (Leaffer Sec. 107c). 
However, notably missing from both is any discussion of collective authorship.  
Embedded within the philosophical discourses of both Locke and Hegel is the notion of 
the romantic author, a quintessential example of the singular “genius” author. Copyright law has 
supported this narrative of the romantic author, conveniently ignoring the history of borrowing 
“as a characteristic feature of musical production in different contexts and historical periods” for 
which hip-hop music is criticized (Arewa 584). In legal discourse: 
the distinction between genius and craftsmanship was a key aspect of conceptions of 
musical authorship. This distinction is still evident today, for example, in discussions of 
whether hip hop should be considered music. As the compositional process of many 
composers suggests, this vision of musical authorship based upon notions of creativity, 
invention, originality, and even genius is far too restrictive a representation of musical 
creation (Arewa 587). 
Copyright law ignores collective authorship, instead only dealing with the legal rights of a single 
author. The sacralization of authors has contributed to the preference of singular authorship; 
sacralization of authors refers specifically to western forms of cultural production and entails: 
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the separation of elite culture from popular culture and the creation of sacred authors. 
Works of these sacred authors could not be abridged or altered and … hierarchies of 
taste, in turn, influenced the formation, development, and operation of intellectual 
property frameworks (Arewa 588). 
The quasi-deification of singular authors helps illustrate why conceptions of collective 
authorship were not included in copyright law. 
In order to protect the “sacred” rights of the singular author, courts and corporations have 
pushed the need to protect these authors from theft; “The author was deployed as a straw man in 
the debate. The unrewarded authorial genius was used as a rhetorical distraction that appealed to 
American romantic individualism” (Vaidhyanathan xxv). Ironically, the same corporations 
peddling this rhetoric appear overly concerned with the rights of the author, specifically the 
economic rights of the author. Corporations are perpetuating the exclusionary concept of the 
singular author in order to protect their property. In the twentieth century, copyright has been 
more concerned with the rights of the publishers, while the rights of the author and the consumer 
are overlooked (Vaidhyanathan xxv). Author and copyright law critic Siva Vaidhyanathan argues 
that the concepts of authorship, ownership, and originality are distorted when viewed through the 
lens of intellectual property, and the discussion should be changed to the question of intellectual 
policy (Vaidhyanathan xxvi). The power of corporations is a concern, and much of their legal 
power can be traced back to the creation of corporate personhood.  
Corporate Personhood and the Economics of Intellectual Property 
The economic argument for copyright is, in the eyes of corporations like Bridgeport 
Music Incorporated, the most compelling argument in favor of strict copyright law. In their view, 
copyright exists to protect the economic viability of the works owned by the copyright holder. 
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Corporations use the notion of the romantic author to construct a narrative characterizing hip-hop 
musicians as an “other” operating outside of traditional (i.e. legal) forms of musical composition. 
The exorbitant licensing fees required to sample a sound recording are another hindrance to 
sampling artists. While many artists responded with a movement away from sampling, some 
artists – for example, mash-up artists – remained defiant, refusing to clear their samples. The 
time, effort, and resources it would require to clear the samples make full legality impossible for 
artists who aren’t supported by a major label record company, with both the capital and the legal 
team to support sampling.  
 The establishment of corporate personhood gave corporations all of the property rights to 
which a natural person is entitled, contributing to the rise in corporate power in America.  In the 
1886 Supreme Court Case, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, the Court decided 
that: 
a private corporation is a person and entitled to the legal rights and protections the 
Constitution affords to any person….Far more remarkable, however, is that the doctrine 
of corporate personhood, which subsequently became a cornerstone of corporate law, was 
introduced in this 1886 decision without argument (Korten 267). 
In fact, Justice Morrison Remick Waite said that the court did not wish to hear an argument on 
the question of whether the provision in the Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution applied to 
corporations, because “we are all of the opinion that it does” (Korten 268). These few sentences 
dramatically changed the evolution of copyright by vastly increasing the legal power of 
corporations. Furthermore, as author David Korten notes, corporate personhood created an 
interesting legal contradiction. Because a corporation is owned by its shareholders, it is the 
shareholders’ property; since a corporation is also a legal person, then the shareholders 
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ownership of a corporation could legally be considered slavery (Korten 268).  Despite the many 
legitimate reasons for not allowing corporate personhood, courts have continued to expand 
corporate rights allowing them to “enjoy virtual unlimited life; virtual freedom of movement 
anywhere on the globe; control of the mass media; the ability to amass legions of lawyers and 
public relations specialists in support of their cause; and freedom from liability for the misdeeds 
of wholly owned subsidiaries” (Korten 268). The legal recognition of corporations as people 
allows companies like Bridgeport Music to wield an enormous amount of legal power, 
continuing the trend of copyright moving to protect the rights of publishers first and foremost. 
Ironically, in colonial America, the first copyright was considerably anti-monopolisitic; Many of 
the founding fathers were against copyright altogether, with Thomas Jefferson arguing that 
binding cultural expression by law would violate its essence (Aufderheide 27). As American 
businesses began to become more invested in the dissemination of works of cultural expression, 
competition within the industry led to more stringent copyright laws (Aufderheide 28). 
Corporations have always played a central role in pushing new copyright legislation, and the:  
legal fiction that the corporation is a natural person is a major lever by which 
corporations…claim free speech rights for themselves in promoting their products 
without public oversight and in seeking to influence public policy, while they use a 
combination of speech and property rights to prohibit the exercise of the right to free 
speech by real people” (Korten 276). 
The legal power held by corporations – specifically recording companies – is best seen in the 
increase in sampling fees that continue to rise, making sampling particularly difficult for 
independent hip-hop producers. 
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The increase in licensing fees is one of the most troubling trends within the music 
industry. The lack of a compulsory licensing fee for sound recording allows the free market to 
take complete control, to the detriment of sampling artists. A recent article in the music 
magazine SPIN puts the average base price to clear a sample at $10,000, with the threat of 
lawsuits over copyright infringement looming over both artists and labels potentially increasing 
that figure (Newton). The article also notes the recent trend in hip-hop production towards 
synthesizers, drum machines, and auto-tune as musical replacements for sampling have increased 
along with licensing fees (Newton). The producer and MC RZA from the Wu-tang Clan 
remembers the “old days” when samples were $2500 or $1500 (Newton). Today, sampling a 
major artist like James Brown could cost $20,000 dollars to clear (Newton). More recently, a 
new type of corporation, the sample troll has become more prevalent in the music industry. In a 
recent article on Slate exploring this phenomenon, Bridgeport Music Incorporated was profiled 
as a leading corporation participating in this trend. Along with other similar catalog companies, 
Bridgeport holds portfolios of old rights (most notably the oft-sampled George Clinton of 
Funkadelic and Parliament fame) and uses lawsuits to receive monetary benefit for unlawful 
sampling (Wu). George Clinton himself has stated that he does not mind the sampling of his 
music, and has claimed that Bridgeport stole some of the copyrights to his songs by faking his 
signature on a number of contracts (Wu). This predatory corporate behavior is justified under 
current copyright law and underscores the need for revision of licensing practices within the 
industry.  
Copyright law continues to be challenged by new art forms that do not fit neatly into the 
romantic notions of authorship, originality, and ownership that are embedded in copyright law. 
Furthermore, the inexact fit of property law theories is a significant factor in the development of 
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copyright law notions which sampling directly challenges. The inexact fit of property law is a 
topic I will explore more in depth in chapter four. As long as hip-hop maintains its current 
visibility in popular culture, companies like Bridgeport Music Incorporated will continue their 
pursuit of sampling artists. In the next chapter, I will explore a number of important cases that 
helped shape the current legal climate, focusing especially on cases involving Bridgeport. I will 
analyze both the legal reasoning of the cases as well as the musical tracks themselves, giving 
specific examples of the ways in which sampling contradicts fundamental aspects of copyright 
law. 
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Chapter 3: The Giant Goes to Court 
 This chapter remixes the previous two chapters, continuing the normative assumption 
running through this thesis that hip-hop has challenged fundamental aspects of copyright law, 
illustrating the need for reform. There are not as many cases as one would think, considering the 
staggering number of samples used in hip-hop production, as well as hip-hop’s increasing 
popularity throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. However, the few cases that have gone 
through the courts have produced decisions that have directly impacted artists’ attitudes toward 
sampling. There has been no clear legal precedent established in any of the courts’ decisions that 
clearly outline legal reasoning that can be applied to subsequent cases. The unclear legality of 
sampling has been met with uncertainty by the hip-hop community, as evidenced by heavily 
biased decisions by some courts. One such case is the 1991 case of Grand Upright Music v. 
Warner Brothers dealing with the Biz Markie song “Alone Again”, and his reappropriation of the 
chorus from the original song by Gilbert O’Sullivan “Alone Again (Naturally)”. While I will 
save in-depth analysis for later, this case will be important to keep in mind throughout the 
chapter.  
As the first two chapters illustrated, copyright law and hip-hop culture are increasingly at 
odds, and the sheer amount of litigation that exists dealing directly with copyright infringement 
from the unlawful use of samples continues to expand. As the previous chapter explained, 
written and oral cultures share very different conceptions of authorship and ownership. The legal 
definitions of authorship and ownership support the notion of the Romantic author, an inherently 
singular entity. This definition of authorship leaves no room for the type of collective authorship 
prevalent in hip-hop culture. In this chapter, I will first give a brief overview of the de minimis 
defense – a ubiquitous and often ambiguous legal defense in these cases – as well as a 
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description of the burden of proof required for the claimant to show there was infringement. All 
three terms, as well as fair use, are central legal concepts in copyright infringement cases dealing 
with hip-hop. The next section of the chapter will feature four specific case studies, Newton v. 
Diamond, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Grand Upright Music Lmtd. v. Warner Brothers Music, and 
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films. In addition to analyzing the cases from a legal 
perspective, I will also analyze the songs at question in the cases, explaining how the song is 
remixed and given a new meaning. The Bridgeport Music case is one of numerous infringement 
cases filed by Bridgeport against hip-hop artists, and the case itself will lead into further 
discussion of the relatively new phenomenon of copyright “trolls”. After the case study, I will 
also discuss a few more recent instances of lawsuits against hip-hop artists, although these 
instances have been settled out of court generally. Most sampling lawsuits settle outside of court, 
and companies like Bridgeport Music actively search for any sampling of works for which they 
own the sound recording copyright. Suing artists for infringement, particularly popular artists, 
can be a significant source of income for companies which own large catalogs of often sampled 
music. There are also instances where the owners of the composition rights to a work object to 
the sampling context and assert their right to exclude in order to punish perceived damaging 
reappropriation of their work. 
The De Minimis Defense, Substantial Similarity, and the Ordinary 
Observer Test 
Along with the fair use doctrine, de minimis, substantial similarity, and the average-audience test 
constitute the legal terms that appear most commonly in the cases I will analyze. It is important 
to have a basic understanding of these concepts before moving into their specific applications, 
especially considering their ambiguity within legal discourse. The three terms are also 
inextricably linked, and to fully understand one it is necessary to understand how they interact 
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with one another. All three terms are especially important in the first two cases I will explain, 
Newton v. Diamond and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. The discussion of these three concepts in both 
cases helped to set precedent for the application of these terms in later cases dealing with hip-hop 
sampling. A copyright infringement allegation must show proof of ownership, copying, and 
unlawful appropriation (Wilson 183).  The burden of proof most relevant within the cases dealt 
with in this chapter is unlawful appropriation. After the court establishes ownership and copying, 
it applies what is called an unlawful appropriation analysis where “the trier of fact determines 
whether a substantial similarity exists between the original and infringed work that exceeds the 
threshold for an unlawful appropriation” (Wilson 184).  
There are two common defenses that appear in sound recording infringement cases: fair 
use and de minimis. Fair use was originally created to protect the right of a third party who wants 
to use a copyrighted work without consent of the author of the original work. As the subject 
matter of copyright expanded, the shortcomings of fair use have become more evident (Evans 
11). There is a four-pronged test for fair use whereby the court examines the alleged infringer’s 
purpose, the nature of the use, the substantiality of the sample, and the impact of the use on the 
potential market for the copyrighted work (Wilson 184). Substantial similarity and de minimis 
use are intrinsically linked and often overlap (Evans 11). There are two different types of 
substantial similarity, but the type most commonly seen in sampling cases is fragmented literal 
similarity. Fragmented literal similarity is distinct from substantial similarity; for example, the 
sampling of one note is generally not recognized as constituting substantial similarity, rather it is 
considered fragmented literal similarity (Wilson 186). The fragmented literal similarity test – a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis examining the amount of appropriation and the way in 
which the sample is situated within the new track – is used to determine whether there is 
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substantial similarity between the tracks (Wilson 186). If there is fragmented literal similarity, 
but no substantial similarity, then the use is considered de minimis, meaning that the copying is 
trivial and insignificant so no liability can result (Evans 11).  
One unclear musical practice that has been discussed with substantial similarity and de 
minimis use is the issue of looping. When a producer samples a small two bar section from the 
song, and loops it throughout their recording, it could be argued that there is substantial 
similarity because of the prominence that that sample plays in the new work; however, two bars 
sampled from a much longer work could just as easily (and should) be considered de minimis use 
(Wilson 187). Another issue that should be considered is the application of the ordinary observer 
test to determinations of substantial similarity and de minimis use. The general test for 
determining the triviality of a sample is whether or not the ordinary observer would recognize 
the sample (Miller 6). This is particularly problematic because of the ambiguity of the term 
average audience. There is no clear precedent established that codifies the specifics of the 
average audience test. Most often in the cases I examine, the court determines whether or not the 
average audience would recognize a sample based on analysis of an expert witness’s (often a 
musicologist) testimony. It is important to note that de minimis is not a part of codified law, but 
rather a legitimate defense that has long been part of copyright case law (Miller 6). For example, 
in the case of Newton v. Diamond which I will explore later, the Ninth circuit court first 
established its acceptance of the de minimis doctrine before concluding that “a successful de 
minimis defense to a copyright infringement claim will depend on whether the average audience, 
or ordinary observer, is able to recognize that a copying has taken place” (Miller 6). It is also 
disconcerting that a complex moral, ethical, and legal issue in determining the legality of sample 
should be left to the ordinary observer test. Additionally, the ambiguity of substantial similarity 
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and de minimis defenses, as the case analyses will explain, is a roadblock that courts have been 
unable to successfully navigate.  
 For each of the case studies, I will first present the facts and method of argument used by 
both parties, accompanied by my own analysis of the tracks. My analysis will use the structure of 
a close listening, analyzing the sampled portion in the context of the original work and its 
reappropriation in the new work. Then, I will explain the court’s reasoning and decision, drawing 
upon the court’s opinion as well as relevant legal scholarship. Finally, I will discuss the legacy of 
the case, explaining how the decision affected both the legal and hip-hop communities 
respectively.  
Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Music 
 The first case I will explore, Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Music is 
the most emblematic of the issues at stake in the application of copyright law to sampling based 
music. Not only did the decision affect later decisions in similar cases, but it also forced hip-hop 
producers to reconsider the collage style of sampling that was prevalent during the late eighties 
and early nineties. This case is a clear example of the types of prejudices that exist towards 
sampling, further highlighting the issues with applying the idea of collective authorship to a 
copyright law which has not historically recognized that type of authorship.  
Unlike the other cases I will explore, the opinion by Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York is notable for its structure and 
style of writing. Only three pages in length, the opinion has a decidedly editorial feel 
encapsulated in the now infamous opening line which quotes Exodus, Chapter 20, Verse 15 
“Thou shalt not steal” (Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Music 2). Judge Duffy 
ended his opinion by “referring the matter to the U.S. attorney to consider prosecuting the 
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defendant for criminal copyright infringement” (Music Copyright Infringement Resource). The 
case deals with hip-hop artist Biz Markie’s song “Alone Again” which was featured on his 
record I Need a Haircut (Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Music 2). The song 
appropriated musical elements, as well as the title from the 1972 song “Alone Again (Naturally)”  
by Gilbert O’Sullivan. Duffy states that it is clear that the sample was improper and unlicensed, 
and “the only issue, therefore, seems to be who owns the copyright to the song ‘Alone Again 
(Naturally)’ and the master recording thereof made by Gilbert O’Sullivan (Grand Upright Music 
Limited v. Warner Brothers Music 2). Duffy then gave three reasons leading him to the 
conclusion that the plaintiff (O’Sullivan) owned the copyrights to both the composition and the 
recording: One, A deed transferring the original copyrights from NAM Music Inc. to Gilbert 
O’Sullivan; Two, testimony from Gilbert O’Sullivan, who is both the composer and performer 
featured on the recording of the original song; Three, the defendants attempted to contact 
O’Sullivan’s agent in order to obtain a license to sample O’Sullivan’s song, were denied 
permission, and decided to release the song anyway (Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner 
Brothers Music 2). Judge Duffy used this reasoning to conclude that “From all of the evidence 
produced in the hearing, it is clear that the defendants knew that they were violating the 
plaintiff’s rights as well as the rights of others. Their only aim was to sell thousands upon 
thousands of records” (Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Music 4). 
This case presents an opportunity to explore the musical elements that could have been 
used to determine whether or not “Alone Again” infringed on Gilbert O’Sullivan’s original 
recording and composition. In an appearance at a film festival, O’Sullivan was asked a question 
about the case and said that Biz Markie approached him to sample the song in 1990. 
Subsequently, O’Sullivan asked him to send a copy of the track; Upon discovering that Biz 
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Markie was a “comic rapper”, O’Sullivan became concerned that the serious nature of his song 
would be tarnished, saying that he will “go to his grave to make sure it is never used in the comic 
scenario which is offensive” (Billyjam). “Alone Again (Naturally)” is about a man left at the 
altar, who is on his way to commit suicide. During the course of the song, the man reflects upon 
the deaths of his mother and father, punctuating each instance with the refrain “alone again, 
naturally”. The Biz Markie song samples the opening piano chords of “Alone Again (Naturally)” 
layering the chords over a drum loop. These musical elements comprise the main production 
techniques used throughout the song. Biz Markie also uses the same repeated refrain “alone 
again, naturally”. The lyrical content of Biz Markie’s version is much more light hearted, 
focusing on “how the rapper [Markie] received no respect as a performer back when he played in 
combos with old friends, but since he had become a solo performer his career had been 
satisfying” (Vaidhyanathan 125). Although there are undeniable similarities between the two 
tracks, the transformative elements of Biz Markie’s track should have been considered in the 
context of a fair use analysis or de minimis defense, especially considering that the main 
similarity between the two tracks is the repeated refrain of “alone again, naturally”. 
The case Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Records has been dissected 
by numerous law review articles, virtually all of them critical of the decision. One of the primary 
criticisms is the tone used and lack of substantive discussion in Judge Duffy’s opinion.  He has 
also been criticized for his lack of sound legal reasoning, because his “opinion essentially 
ignored the de minimis and fair use defenses and characterized sampling as de facto theft” 
(Vrana 9). Judge Duffy is not the first person to equate hip-hop music with theft. His decision 
reveals “a disdainful, if not contemptuous, view by the judges for the type of musical borrowing 
involved in hip-hop as a genre”(Arewa 581). Classifying hip-hop as theft ignores the long, 
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documented history of borrowing in all musical forms which indicates a “tendency to detach hip-
hop from the broader history of musical borrowing” a tactic that is “central to representations of 
hip hop and hip hop musical practices as an ‘other’” (Arewa 581). Furthermore, legal discussions 
of hip-hop reflect the preference for the use of nineteenth century hierarchies of musical 
description, which only further separates hip-hop from the more mainstream view of musical 
production (Arewa 10). These “discourses of difference have the effect of characterizing and 
framing hip-hop in a way that justifies negative evaluations of hip-hop’s aesthetic value” (Arewa 
584).  
The Grand Upright decision affected hip-hop artists almost as significantly as it did 
future sampling cases. After 1991, there was an undeniable decline in the amount of samples 
used in the typical hip-hop song. While the decision did not completely remove sampling from 
the music industry it caused “the death of tricky, playful, transgressive sampling” because the 
“courts and the industry misapplied stale, blunt, ethnocentric, and simplistic standards to fresh 
new methods of expression” (Vaidhyanathan 127). The decision set a precedent which allowed 
artists to deny sampling requests if they objected to the subject matter, or simply for no reason 
other than the fact that it is their property, and they can do with it what they please 
(Vaidhyanathan 127). There are critics who still argue that declaring the death of liberal 
sampling is inaccurate, with one such critic claiming that this reactionary discourse is 
emblematic of the tendency of scholars to “overstate copyright’s inhibiting influence on 
recoding” (Joo 16). This same critic refutes the claim that the Grand Upright decision 
emboldened copyright owners contributing to the rise in burdensome licensing costs, arguing 
that “samplers paid for copyright permission since the beginning of recorded hip-hop” (Joo 17). 
Furthermore, the critic supports Duffy’s lack of response to the question of whether Biz Markie’s 
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use of the sample constituted de minimis or fair use, arguing that because the infringing party 
knew that a license was not obtained, they knew that it was theft (Joo 18). This argument is 
problematic in the casual dismissal of the completely legitimate argument that could have been 
made for de minimis or fair use. Furthermore, this type of legal writing perpetuates the 
discussion of hip-hop musical aesthetics as being an “other” that evident in a large amount of 
legal discourse. 
Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Music emphasizes the need for 
revision of our copyright laws. The ambiguity of the language of copyright laws, its preference 
for nineteenth century musical evaluation discourse, and the categorization of hip-hop as an 
“other” restrict sampling artists’ creativity.  The next two cases that I will explore put forward 
decisions that were much more favorable for hip-hop artists. However, there are significant 
shortcomings with each case, and the legacy of both cases remains uncertain. 
 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
The 1994 case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose is particularly influential because it is one of 
the few copyright cases that went to the Supreme Court. It was also only the second time ever 
that the Supreme Court addressed the fair use defense in the context of a parody (Babiskin 194). 
While the case went through a number of lower courts on the way to the Supreme Court, I will 
focus my analysis on the opinion delivered by Justice Souter of the Supreme Court.  
The 1989 song “Pretty Woman”, composed by Luther R. Campbell of the popular rap 
group 2 Live Crew, was a satirical take  on the song “Oh, Pretty Woman” (Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music 1). “Oh, Pretty Woman” was written in 1964 by Roy Orbison and William Dees, 
who after recording the song, subsequently gave their rights to Acuff-Rose Music, who 
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registered the song for copyright protection (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music 1). 2 Live Crew’s 
manager sent a letter to Acuff-Rose music informing them that they had recorded a parody of 
“Oh, Pretty Woman”, enclosing both a copy of the lyrics and the recording; In addition, 2 Live 
Crew’s manager stated that they would give all authorship and ownership of the original song to 
the copyright holders, and that they were willing to pay a licensing fee (Campbell v. Acuff Rose 
Music 1). 2 Live Crew was denied permission, but they decided to release the song anyway, still 
crediting Orbison, Dees, and Acuff-Rose as the authors and publisher of the original song in the 
liner notes (Babiskin 210). The 2 Live Crew album As Clean as They Wanna Be, on which 
“Pretty Woman” appeared, went on to sell nearly a quarter of a million copies before Acuff-Rose 
Music sued for copyright infringement (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music 1). The District Court 
that first heard the case determined that 2 Live Crew’s song made fair use of the original, before 
that decision was reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
(Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music 2). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the district court had put 
too little emphasis on the commercial use of the track, asserting that the track’s blatantly 
commercial use prevented the parody from being considered a fair use (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
2). 
It is important to remember that in all determinations of fair use, the court must refer 
back to section 107 of the United States copyright law. In order to be considered fair use, the 
court examines the work based on four factors: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of 
the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect of the use 
on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work (17 USCS Sec. 107). In his opinion, 
Justice Souter notes that: 
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From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted 
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts….’ U.S. Const., Art. I sec. 8, cl. 8. For as Justice 
Story explained, ‘in truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if 
any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every 
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much 
which was well known and used before (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music 2) 
Souter’s inclusion of this quote is particularly interesting when examined within the context of 
the notion of the Romantic author. As I explained in Chapter 2, the idea of the singular author is 
synonymous with the notion of the Romantic author. Interestingly, this quote is more evocative 
of post-modern theory than legal writing. This quote also helps contextualize Justice Souter’s 
reasoning as he examines the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose case, looking at the four factors necessary 
for fair use. 
 In his opinion, Justice Souter focuses on the first factor of fair use, the purpose and 
character of the use. In the case of a parody, Souter argues that the mode of enquiry adopted by 
the court, should determine to what extent the work is transformative, especially considering that 
“the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of the other 
factors”(Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 3). He then proceeds to define parody within a strictly legal 
context, concluding that “the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the 
use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, 
comments on that author’s works”(Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 3). Furthermore, Souter 
distinguishes between parody and satire, noting that “parody needs to mimic an original to make 
its point” whereas “satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very 
59 
 
 
act of borrowing”(Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 3). He then moves to an examination of the elements 
that make “Pretty Woman” a parody, focusing on the transformative nature of the lyrics. Justice 
Souter notes that, although the District court found that the first line of “Pretty Woman” was the 
same as the original, the 2 Live crew song “’quickly degenerates into a play on words, 
substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones’”(Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 4). The fair use 
factor most deserving of attention according to Justice Souter was the fourth factor, which 
focused on the commercial nature of the use; this fourth factor was an important point of issue 
for both of the District Court’s and Court of Appeal’s decisions, especially the latter, having used 
the commercial nature of the work to overturn the District Court’s ruling of fair use (Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose 8). Justice Souter criticized the Court of Appeals decision for focusing too heavily 
on the fourth factor (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 8). As to the question of how the parody will affect 
the market for the original, Justice Souter argued that “it is more likely that the new work will 
not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under this factor, that is , by acting as a 
substitute for it” (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 8). Finally, Justice Souter concluded that the Court of 
Appeals erred in their decision that the commercial nature of the parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman” 
made it unfair. The Supreme Court also determined that the Court of Appeals erred in asserting 
that 2 Live Crew excessively copied from the Orbison original and reversed the judgment 
(Campbell v. Acuff-Rose). 
 This case is unique because it is a parody, and doesn’t require the same type of close 
listening as other cases in regards deciphering samples. As I listened to both tracks, the most 
striking aspect of 2 Live Crew’s Pretty Woman” was its simplicity. “Oh, Pretty Woman” is a 
very recognizable song, and one that I first heard years ago, unable to escape its ubiquity in 
popular culture. The most instantly recognizable aspect of the original is the opening guitar riff. 
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Its repetition throughout the song enhances its memorability. Unsurprisingly, the guitar riff is the 
sample used in the 2 Live Crew parody to form the basis of the underlying musical track. The 
construction of “Pretty Woman” is very simple, consisting of a rudimentary drum beat and vinyl 
scratches layered under the guitar riff. The production for the verses is even simpler, featuring 
only the drum beat with the occasional accent of a brief sample of the guitar riff. Clearly, the 
most transformative aspect of the parody is the lyrics, which are thematically much different 
from the original. The 2 Live Crew lyrics subvert the original image of the pretty woman 
embodied in “Oh, Pretty Woman” by focusing on the negative characteristics of the women 
portrayed in their song. The repetition of the phrase “Pretty Woman” in the Orbison version is 
only used in the first verse of the 2 Live Crew version. The phrase changes to “Big hairy 
woman” in the second verse, “Bald headed woman” in the third, and finally “Two timin’ 
woman” in the final verse. Clearly, the transformative elements of “Pretty Woman” make it clear 
that the song is a parody of the original. 
 Despite the enormous legal influence wielded by the Supreme Court, the legacy of this 
case is unclear. The narrow subject matter of the case inherently makes it difficult to determine 
what exactly its effects could have been within the hip-hop community. Obviously, the Supreme 
Court was only able to comment on parodies. However Souter’s discussion of fair use and his 
assertion that all works of art rely on previous works, shows the importance that the Supreme 
Court places on fair use. The Court’s decision illustrated a desire to balance the issues that could 
arise between “too narrow a construction of fair use which would stifle free speech and too 
liberal a construction which would openly incite litigation and abuse” (Babiskin 224). Another 
crucial aspect of the decision was a desire not to base its ruling on the court’s perception of 
artistic merit, which could set precedent for judges to essentially become cultural police, 
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determining which works are allowed to legally exist based on artistic merit (Babiskin 225). 
Justice Souter’s illuminates the difficulty of attempting to set legal precedent. In their decision, a 
court must consider the effect that their legal reasoning could have on later cases. 
Newton v. Diamond 
The 2003 case of Newton v. Diamond is another influential decision in copyright law. 
The plaintiff, jazz flutist James W. Newton claimed infringement of a six-second sample of his 
song “Choir” on the grounds that the defendants, The Beastie Boys, did not acquire a license for 
the composition (James W. Newton v. Diamond). The Beastie Boys used a sample from “Choir” 
in their 1992 song “Pass the Mic”, which “looped said sample as a background element…so that 
it appears over forty times in various renditions of the song (James W. Newton v. Diamond 593). 
Newton first learned of his appearance in the song and the popularity of that song from one of his 
students at California State University (Blessing 2399). Newton composed the song in 1978, and 
then recorded and performed it in 1981, licensing the rights to the sound recording to ECM 
records, from whom the Beastie Boys paid a fee of one thousand dollars in exchange for a 
license to portions of the sound recording (James W. Newton v. Diamond 593). Newton was 
inspired to write “Choir” from his earliest memory of music watching four women singing in a 
church, and the composition “intended to incorporate elements of African-American gospel 
music, Japanese ceremonial court music, traditional African music, and classical music among 
others” (James W. Newton v. Diamond 592). The sampled portion of the original composition 
consists of three notes, C, D-flat, C which were sung over a background C note played on the 
flute (James W. Newton v. Diamond).  
One important caveat to this case is that the only consideration of infringement relates to 
whether or not there are any infringements on the compositional uniqueness of the original work, 
62 
 
 
because the Beastie Boys acquired a license for the sound recording. Newton and his experts 
argued that the sound recording of “Choir” is “the product of Newton’s highly developed 
performance techniques, rather than the result of a generic rendition of the composition” (James 
W. Newton v. Diamond 595). Essentially, the plaintiff argued that the sophistication and 
uniqueness of Newton’s performance technique embodied in the original sound recording would 
be clear to an average observer, and therefore the sample should be considered copyright 
infringement. However, the court ruled that this argument was invalid because the uniqueness of 
the technique is not clear from the transcribed composition and therefore, the real question is 
whether or not the unauthorized use of the composition was substantial enough to constitute 
infringement (James W. Newton v. Diamond 596). The Beastie Boys and their expert argued that 
the sample is: 
‘merely a common, trite, and generic three-note sequence, which lacks any distinct 
melodic, harmonic, rhythmic or structural elements’. Dr. Fererra [the expert] also 
described the sequence as ‘a common building block tool’ used over and over again by 
major composers in the 20
th
 century, particularly the ‘60s and ‘70s, just prior to James 
Newton’s usage (James W. Newton v. Diamond 598). 
The defense essentially used this testimony to argue that there is no inherent uniqueness 
embodied in the recording, and it is impossible for there to be any substantial similarity between 
the two works. Therefore, the use of the sample would be qualified as de minimis.  
 In my own listening analysis of “Choir” and “Pass the Mic”, I was easily able to 
recognize the sample clearly in both iterations. In “Choir”, the sample first appears at the 
beginning of the recording, and is then heard again towards the end. In the sound recording, 
James Newton uses the appropriately named “Newton technique”, simultaneously playing a held 
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c on the flute while singing overtop. He varies the sung melody throughout the use of the 
technique before moving into a new section, where he plays the flute more traditionally. He then 
reuses the same intro section with the “Newton technique” as an outro to end the song. In “Pass 
the Mic”, the sample is also first heard at the beginning of the song, however it is clearly pitched 
down and there are almost certainly other effects used to alter the sample. The sample is heard 
only once before the looped drum sample starts, and then heard multiple times throughout the 
rest of the recording. While someone intimately familiar with “Choir” would most likely 
recognize the sample at the beginning of “Pass the Mic”, the context of the sample is radically 
different. In a procedure typical of hip-hop, the Beastie Boys looped the sample throughout the 
song, layering on different musical elements (i.e. other samples, drum loops, vocals) to create the 
aesthetic of the entire track. The “Choir” sample is simply one small musical element of “Pass 
the Mic”. If the Beastie Boys had used that sample more often, and also appropriated the more 
traditional melodic section of “Choir” as the hook, then a more compelling argument could have 
been made for infringement. It is clear to me from listening to both tracks that, although 
Newton’s technique is certainly distinctive, the use of the sample in “Pass the Mic” is only a 
smaller part of the rest of the song.  
The opinion of the court in the Newton v. Diamond case was delivered by Chief Judge 
Schroeder, who asserted that “in relation to Newton’s composition as a whole, the sampled 
portion is neither quantitatively nor qualitatively significant” and that “it is difficult to measure 
the precise relationship between this segment and the composition as a whole” (James W. 
Newton v. Diamond 597). The main issue with Newton’s charge of infringement is the fact that 
he must prove that the three-note sample is original in the context of the transcribed composition. 
The testimony provided by Newton’s musical experts focused on the significance of the 
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performance in the context of the sound recording, which the Beastie Boys properly licensed, 
and therefore was not particularly relevant to the case. Judge Schroeder further explained that 
“On the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that an average audience would not discern 
Newton’s hand as a composer, apart from his talent as a performer, from Beastie Boys’ use of 
the sample” (James W. Newton v. Diamond 598). In conclusion, the court found that the works 
are not substantially similar to one another, and that the Beastie Boys’ use of the “Choir” 
composition was a case of de minimis use.  
Interestingly, in the dissent written by Circuit Judge Graber, the Graber argued that the 
sampled portion of “Choir” qualifies as original and is copyrightable; furthermore, a jury should 
be able to reasonably assert that the Beastie Boys use of the sample was substantially similar to 
the original work and therefore does not constitute de minimis use (James W. Newton v. 
Diamond 598). The Judge continued the argument by writing that the “presented evidence that 
the compositional elements of “Choir” are so compositionally distinct that a reasonable listener 
would recognize the sampled segment even if it were performed by the featured flautist of a 
middle school orchestra” (James W. Newton v. Diamond 598).  It is important to note that Judge 
Graber agreed with the majority, but disagreed with the court’s analysis of the expert testimony 
(Miller 9). The decision handed down in Newton v. Diamond was straightforward, particularly in 
its application of the de minimis doctrine, and seemed to establish a legally sound application of 
the de minimis doctrine that could also be applied to sound recordings. However, as the next case 
illustrates, the ambiguity of the de minimis doctrine – and to a much larger extent copyright law 
– allows for individual courts to produce significantly different decisions in similar cases. 
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Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films: A Sample “Troll” is Born 
 The most recent and dissected of all of the cases that I have explored, Bridgeport Music 
v. Dimension Films is reminiscent of Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brother Music for 
its effect on both the hip-hop and legal communities. Although the Bridgeport case discusses 
musical elements in the opinion, the strict application of legal principles, and general discussion 
of hip-hop musical aesthetics are reminiscent of the Grand Upright Case. Bridgeport Music v. 
Dimension Films is notable because it is part of a larger group of claims of infringement filed on 
May 4, 2001; Bridgeport and its related companies, Southfield Music, Westbound Records, and 
Nine Records, alleged nearly 500 counts against 800 defendants for copyright infringement for 
the use of samples without permission in various new rap recordings (Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films 1). Bridgeport Music v. Dimension films is also notable for establishing a rule 
applying to the sampling of sound recordings that essentially eliminated the de minimis doctrine 
as a viable defense. Bridgeport is what has been called a sample troll: “Similar to its cousins the 
patent trolls, Bridgeport and companies like it hold portfolios of old rights” and “use lawsuits to 
extort money from successful music artists for routine sampling, no matter how minimal or 
unnoticeable” (Wu). After I explain the significance of the Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films 
decision, I will elaborate on the sample troll phenomenon giving a few examples of notable 
artists caught in the crossfire.  
 The 2005 case of Bridgeport Music v. Dimension films concerns the use of a sample 
from the song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” by Funkadelic in the song “100 Miles and Runnin’” 
by the rap group N.W.A. (Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films 1). The case was first heard by 
the District court who determined that the defendant’s copying was de minimis; the decision was 
appealed by the defendant and subsequently heard by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Brodin 
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849). Bridgeport and their sister companies owned the copyrights to “Get Off You Ass and Jam”.  
The song “100 Miles”, by rap group N.W.A. was featured on the sound track of the movie I Got 
the Hook Up, which is owned by the defendant in the case (Bridgeport Music v. Dimension 
Films 1). The sample in question was a “three-note combination solo guitar ‘riff’ that lasted four 
seconds”; “100 Miles” used a two-second looped sample from the guitar solo,  lowered the pitch, 
and then looped the sample for sixteen beats (Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films 2). The 
defendant argued that “the sample was not protected by copyright law because it was not 
‘original’” and “that the sample was legally insubstantial and therefore does not amount to 
actionable copying under copyright law”(Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films 2). The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals first summarized the District Courts’ decision writing that the court 
found that the sample passed de minimis analysis because “no reasonable juror, even one 
familiar with the works of George Clinton, would recognize the source of the sample without 
having been told of its source” (Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films 3). The Sixth Circuit 
Court overturned this decision reasoning that “no substantial similarity or de minimis inquiry 
should be undertaken at all when the defendant has not disputed that it digitally sampled a 
copyrighted sound recording” (Bridgeport Music v. Dimension 3). The court further enforced 
this claim using Section 106  of the U.S. Copyright law which gives the owner of the copyright 
exclusive rights to “prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work” (17 USCS Sec. 
106.2). Section 114(b) also states that this right is limited to “the right to prepare a derivative 
work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or 
otherwise altered in sequence or quality” (17 USCS Sec. 114.b).  
 The reasoning that the Sixth Circuit Court gave completely eliminated the de minimis 
and fair use defenses in any case of unlicensed sampling of a sound recording, establishing a 
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bright-line rule that was intended to expedite the other 800 case in which Bridgeport is currently 
embroiled (Brodin 851). The decision has been criticized as being “an example of the stifling 
effect of copyright law on music” and it has been argued that the “infringement rule should be 
overturned and the traditional defenses of de minimis and fair use should be applied in all sound 
recording infringement cases” (Evans 14). The decision has also been criticized by other circuit 
courts, with some courts refusing to apply the bright-line rule in similar cases leading to a split 
that could “prove to be the tipping point leading at a minimum to a judicial remedy, or more 
necessarily, a legislative one” (Evans 14). Despite the overwhelming negative response to the 
decision, there are still some supporters of the Bridgeport decision who argue that critics are 
engaging in a misreading of the decision, particularly in the effect the decision has had on the 
hip-hop community. One critic argues that the Bridgeport rule “expands sound-recording 
copyrights in a direction denied to other copyrights” (Joo 34). As to the question of the effect of 
the decision on the music industry, the same critic argues that the reasoning in the case is 
consistent with the “well-established practice in the music industry by the late 1980s to seek 
copyright permission for both lengthy recognizable samples and for briefer, slice-and-dice 
samples” (Joo 34). The term “slice-and-dice” is an inaccurate way to refer to sampling, reflecting 
an ignorance of hip-hop musical aesthetic. “Slice-and-dice” is used to refer to sampling 
specifically within a hip-hop context. This type of inexact terminology encourages the narrative  
that situates sampling practices outside of more accepted forms of musical composition, despite 
the long history of borrowing and appropriation in all forms of music.  
 The emergence of sampling trolls like Bridgeport Music signal the need for reform in our 
copyright law system. A sampling troll “strategically stockpiles musical rights (sometimes 
through unscrupulous means). Using first threats and then lawsuits, it shakes musicians and 
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labels down for suspected sampling ‘no matter how minimal and unnoticeable’” (Ashtar 268). 
These companies like Bridgeport, often do not represent the original artists, “but are merely 
catalog companies that create profits by suing infringers of copyrights they have purchased” 
(DeBriyn 86). This is a troublesome trend in the music industry, and it does not make sense that 
copyright law should exist to protect the interests of opportunistic corporations who are using the 
current system to attack sampling artists. This litigious environment only deters more artists from 
using sampling in their songs. New artists are not the only possible targets of companies like 
Bridgeport, as another sample troll, Drive-In Music Company, filed suit against Sony BMG 
Entertainment for the use of a sample from Come On In by Music Machine in the 1991 Cypress 
Hill song “How I Could Just Kill a Man” (DeBriyn 87). The ability afforded to sample trolls to 
make money “simply by enforcing rights in old works without creating their own new works” is 
a troublesome trend in the music industry, and signals the need for serious discussion about 
possible reforms for copyright law (DeBriyn 87). 
 Despite the ever increasing popularity of sample-based music – and the ever increasing 
popularity of litigation involving sampling based music – copyright is not any closer to a 
solution to deal with sampling. The application of the law in these cases is decidedly 
inconsistent, as individual courts attempted to establish clear precedents that were largely 
ignorant of the musical aesthetic of hip-hop sampling practices. These cases also reinforce the 
difficulty arising from attempts to establish clear, definable guidelines that can be applied to 
sampling on a case-by-case basis. In the next chapter, I will attempt to bridge the seemingly 
limitless philosophical gap between copyright law and hip-hop music by explaining some 
possible reforms that have already been suggested. In light of the material presented in the 
previous two chapters, I will also update my definition of internal hip-hop sampling ethics. 
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Chapter 4: Copyright Reform and the Ethics of Sampling Redux 
 The emergence of hip-hop has accentuated unclear aspects of copyright law that have 
been discussed and debated for decades. The rapid increase in the popularity of sample-based 
production in the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by an increase in sales. As hip-hop became 
more lucrative, there was more incentive for artists whose music was sampled to pursue 
litigation, especially if the new song that featured their sample was popular. As I explained in 
chapter 3, although hip-hop has been discussed and dissected in the courtroom since the first case 
in 1991 Grand Upright Limited v. Dimension Films, there has not been any significant 
movement towards a clearer understanding of when a license is needed for sampling. 
Furthermore, the increased cost of licensing in the wake of the Grand Upright decision has only 
continued to increase. As a result of this environment, companies like Bridgeport Music have 
pursued litigation for any unlicensed sampling from the vast library of copyrights that they hold. 
Many hip-hop artists have reacted to this new industry practice by becoming much more cautious 
in their sampling practices, sometimes abandoning the practice altogether.  
 While the previous two chapters have focused on narrower issues within copyright law, 
the first part of this final chapter will explain what I see as the central issue with Copyright law: 
the inexact fit of property law theories and rights when applied to the field of intellectual 
property. The concept of property is one that is central to the United States Constitution and has 
historically been seen as a moral right. However, if property generally is a better way to deal 
with the issue of tangible goods, it has been particularly problematic when applied to the 
decidedly less tangible realm of musical ideas. Central to this problematic application of property 
law theories has been the adoption of the most important of the “bundle” of rights afforded to 
property owners: the right to exclude. While I will explain the specifics of this right later, it is 
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important to remember back to the last chapter, and the Grand Upright decision. The plaintiff in 
that case, Gilbert O’Sullivan the composer and copyright holder of the song “Alone Again 
(Naturally), objected to Biz Markie’s use of the sample because it changed the original meaning 
of the song. The right to exclude grants the author significant power, as they are able to legally 
contest arguably transformative uses of their songs if they disagree with the changed context. A 
related issue, one that has been just as troublesome in copyright law as the inexact fit of property 
rights, is the legal power granted to the author, or the “owner” as understood in property law. As 
I explained briefly in chapter two, the author is a particularly problematic term within copyright 
law. The author is a decidedly ambiguous term not only within a legal context, but in the artistic 
world as well. Sampling further complicates the already problematic conception of authorship, 
particularly the notion of the romantic author that is deeply embedded within copyright law. The 
conception of the author is no less clear outside of the legal realm, with postmodern discourse 
most notably grappling with the definition of the author. 
 In this chapter, I will explore the issues of the inexact fit of property rights to intellectual 
property – specifically the right to exclude, which is the exclusive right of a property owner to 
refuse the use of their property to another person. In order to address these issues, I will 
introduce postmodern concepts from the writings of Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and 
Michael Foucault. In contrast to the right to exclude, I will introduce Derrida’s concept of 
iterability and the related concept of authorial intent. The Barthes and Foucault writings will 
present postmodern theories regarding the role of the author. In addition to this, I will present 
some possible reforms that have been proposed that could potentially ameliorate the effects of 
the issues discussed throughout this thesis. Finally, I will update the internal definition of 
sampling ethics that I presented in chapter one by profiling El-P, one of the most influential 
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underground hip-hop artists of the last twenty years. His unique production techniques will help 
to explain the changes that have occurred in hip-hop production contemporaneous with the legal 
decisions that I have explored in the previous chapter. Furthermore, this section will help to 
apply all of the previous discussion about effect of copyright to the hip-hop community. 
The Right to Exclude and Iterability 
 In this section, I will introduce the concept of the right to exclude. The right to exclude is 
part of the bundle of rights that characterize property law; The other rights include the rights to 
consume a resource, to transfigure it, to transfer it, to bequeath or devise it, to pledge it as 
collateral, to subdivide it into smaller interests, etc. (Merrill 730). The right to exclude is 
fundamental to the concept of property and these other rights are all purely contingent on the 
right to exclude when referring to the bundle of rights (Merrill 731). The concept of the right to 
exclude has been a central part of property law for hundreds of years. Historically, there have 
been three distinct arguments used to support the primacy of the right to exclude. According to 
Merrill, the first argument runs as follows: 
if one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive most of the other attributes 
commonly associated with property through the addition of relatively minor clarification 
about the domain of the exclusion right. On the other hand, if one starts with any other 
attribute of property, one cannot derive the right to exclude by extending the domain of 
that other attribute; rather, one must add the right to exclude as an additional premise 
(Merrill 740) 
According to Merrill, the second argument supporting the notion of the right to exclude has its 
roots in primitive property rights systems, and the other rights evolved as property systems 
became increasingly complex indicating that the right to exclude is the key right to 
72 
 
 
understanding property (Merrill 745). Finally, according to Merrill, the argument regarding 
existing legal practice stipulates that in all instances where the law has recognized a right to 
property, it recognizes a right to exclude (Merrill 747). 
 Because intellectual property borrows so many key concepts from property law, the right 
to exclude occupies a similar position in regards to the intangible possessions that comprise 
copyright, patent, and trademark law.  It is important to note here that the legal precedent of the 
right to exclude has its roots firmly embedded in the eighteenth century, when English legal 
theorist Sir William Blackstone published a series of four volumes that explored the right of 
property and its centrality to human life (How to Fix Copyright 177). The principle of the right to 
exclude has remained virtually unchanged since the time of Sir William Blackstone. One 
prominent critic of modern copyright law, William Patry, made the point that it is: 
as if rhetorical views expressed about English landed estates at a time when England first 
passed the stamp tax against the American colonies can resolve the question of whether 
an internet video hosting service should be liable for making Danger Mouse’s Grey 
Album mash-up of the Beatles White Album and Jay-Z’s Black Album available for 
viewing (How to Fix Copyright 178). 
This example reinforces the absurdity of attempting to apply the right to exclude to the wide 
variety of intellectual property issues that are discussed today. Obviously, when the right to 
exclude was developed as an inalienable property right, it was not meant to apply to the issues of 
whether or not a musician has the right to exclude another musician from sampling their work. 
The right to exclude as has been described has being more striking in the case of intellectual 
property. More specifically, the right to exclude is just as inseparable when it is applied to 
intangible goods (Merrill 749). What is particularly problematic about the right to exclude is how 
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the concept of the owner translates over to copyright law. Copyright law recognizes the rights of 
the author, who is essentially the owner of the copyrights. The right to exclude puts enormous 
power into the hands of this author (owner) which allows them to exclude other artists from 
using their work. The owner can exclude even if that reuse is transformative, changing the 
context and therefore the original meaning.  
Jacques Derrida’s concept of iterability may be helpful here, in that it underlines 
problems with granting the author the right to exclude. In his essay “Signature, Event, Context” 
Derrida explores the term communication, first as it is understood in writing. His goal for the 
essay is to “demonstrate why a context is never absolutely determinable, or rather in what way 
its determination is never certain or saturated” (Derrida 310). In the essay, Derrida is dealing 
specifically with writing, but he also notes how his ideas are not only limited to text. Inherent in 
the communication of any idea or thought through signs is absence. As Derrida explains, in order 
for a text to be considered writing, it must be able to exist absent the author: 
My “written communication” must, if you will, remain legible despite the absolute 
disappearance of every determined addressee in general for it to function as writing, that 
is, for it to be legible. It must be repeatable – iterable – in the absolute absence of the 
addressee or of the empirically determinable set of addressees. This iterability (iter, once 
again, comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows may be read as the 
exploitation of the logic which links repetition to alterity), structures the mark of writing 
itself, and does so moreover for no matter what type of writing…A writing that was not 
structurally legible – iterable – beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing 
(Derrida 315). 
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Essentially, the right to exclude is based on assumptions that contradict the concept of iterability 
that Derrida introduces. The power granted to the author by intellectual property law allows them 
to exclude the grafting of alternative meanings onto their work. To borrow from Derrida’s 
terminology this means that the work itself is illegible because “for the written to be written, it 
must continue to ‘act’ and to be legible even if what is called the author of the writing no longer 
answers for what he has written” (Derrida 316). Derrida’s conception of iterability also relies on 
the key idea that there is the possibility of “citational grafting which belongs to the structure of 
every mark…as writing, that is, as a possibility of functioning cut off, at a certain point, from its 
‘original’ meaning and from its belonging in a saturable and constraining context” (Derrida 320). 
The ability for composers to refuse licensing the rights to their work to a sampling artist 
ignores iterability, the way in which a text inevitability deviates from its original meaning, with 
the possibility of new contexts and meanings being created. Also important in Derrida’s 
definition of iterability is the way in which it challenges copyright’s privileging of authorial 
intent. The right to exclude gives the author the ability to control the range of meanings that are 
attached to their work, limiting the ability of consumers to attach their own meanings to the 
work. Iterability, however clearly explains that once a text is written and distributed in the world, 
the author loses the ability to control the meanings. The attempt to limit the meanings of a work 
ignores the infinite number of interpretations that different people will derive from an original 
work. It is not uncommon for artists to simply refuse a licensing request simply because they 
object to the new context. The implications for this were seen in the case of Grand Upright 
Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Records in which Gilbert O’Sullivan objected to Biz Markie’s 
use of his song because it changed the original meaning. It has also more recently been seen in a 
lawsuit brought against Rick Ross for a sample used in his 2012 song “3 Kings”. Ross was sued 
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in early 2013 by Clara Shepherd Warrick and Jimmy Lee Weary, members of the Gospel group 
Crowns of Glory for sampling the 1976 song “I’m So Grateful (Keep in Touch)” (Carpenter). In 
the lawsuit, the defendants claimed that the music and lyrics were hijacked, and meant to only be 
performed as “spiritually uplifting gospel music” (Watkins 1). The Rick Ross version of the song 
features unsavory language that according to Crowns of Glory “continues to destroy the value of 
the [original] song in gospel circles” (Watkins 2). This lawsuit is a perfect example of the type of 
power afforded to copyright owners, and how it directly contradicts the concept of iterability. 
Warrick and Weary object to the use of their song simply because of the drastically different 
subject matter that the lyrics of the Rick Ross version convey. The sample absorbs the context 
and meaning that Rick Ross applies to his song, diverging from the authorial intent applied to the 
original Crowns of Glory song. The Rick Ross lawsuit also reinforces the need for a better 
understanding of the author, hopefully so that copyright can move away from the ultimately 
restrictive notion of the romantic author, which will be the focus of the next section. 
 Moving Towards a Better Conception of the Author/Owner  
 As I explained in chapter two, the concept of the author is a particularly important site of 
conflict between copyright law and hip-hop. The author is essentially interchangeable with the 
owner in copyright law, even though the owner of a copyright is not always the original author of 
a work. The author is a particularly ambiguous concept within copyright law, one that has been 
discussed at length in other literature. The works of Roland Barthes and Michael Foucault raised 
a number of important questions about notions of western authorship that dominate copyright 
law.  
Before discussing Barthes and Foucault, it will be useful to revisit the notion of the 
romantic author. In copyright law, the romantic author embodies the essence of true authorship 
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and originality, reinforcing the image of a lone genius (Arewa 567). Originality “serves as a 
minimum threshold for copyrightability”; Inherent in the legal definition of originality is an 
“independent creation, which essentially appears to rule out or significantly limit borrowing” 
(Arewa 566). Furthermore, genius is important to the legal definition of an author because “such 
conceptions were used to justify allocation of property rights to authors, who were deemed 
worthy of such ownership rights by virtue of their genius and originality” (Arewa 566). 
 Roland Barthes criticized the western conception of the author in his essay “The Death of 
the Author”, defining the author as: 
a modern figure, a product of our society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages with 
English empiricism, French rationalism and the personal faith of Reformation….which 
has attached the greatest importance to the ‘person’ of the author….The explanation of a 
work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the 
end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single 
person, the author ‘confiding’ in us (Barthes 143). 
This conception of the author is clearly the one that dominates copyright law, and is part of the 
reason that the author is afforded so much control over their work. Furthermore, this definition 
helps to illuminate the difficulties a sampling artist must face when they are explicitly borrowing 
from another author. Barthes challenges the conception of the omnipotent author, endowing his 
work with delimited meaning, by arguing that “a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination” (Barthes 148). This means that the creation of meaning is centered on the reader, not 
the author. It is in this way that Barthes claims the death of the author. 
 Michael Foucault took Barthes’ ideas further, reviving the idea of the author, and 
challenging normative assumptions about the role of an author. Foucault does not declare the 
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death of the author, but rather redefines the western conception of the author in a way that could 
be particularly useful when applied to copyright law. Before Foucault discusses the author more 
simply, he introduces the concept of the “author function” which is “characteristic of the mode of 
existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society” (Foucault 108). 
This definition differentiates between an author and a writer; Foucault gives the example of 
random text on a wall that probably has a writer, but not an author (Foucault 108). Foucault 
further defines the author function by introducing four characteristic traits: 
(1) The author function is linked to the juridicial and institutional system that 
encompasses, determines, and articulates the universe of discourses; (2) it does not 
affect all discourses in the same way at all times and in all types of civilization; (3) it 
is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to a producer, but rather 
by a series of specific and complex operations: (4) it does not refer purely and simply 
to a real individual, since it can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to several 
subjects – positions that can be occupied by different classes of individuals (Foucault 
113). 
This conception of authorship is particularly useful because it challenges the notion of the 
lone genius embedded within romantic authorship. While Foucault’s definition of the author is 
certainly important, it is important to realize the larger goal of the chapter which is to apply these 
concepts to copyright in a meaningful way. Furthermore, it is important to remember that very 
often, the legal author is not a musician, but rather a corporation. The author Siva Vaidhyanathan 
reinforces some issues with this mode of philosophical discourse, writing: “We can deconstruct 
the author for six more decades and still fail to prevent the impending concentration of the 
content, ownership, control, and delivery of literature, music, and data” (Vaidhyanathan xxiv). 
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While this is certainly a valid point, this in-depth deconstruction of the term authorship is 
necessary to gain a complete understanding of the philosophical dilemmas that legal discourse 
must attempt to overcome. What is especially useful about Foucault’s conception of the author is 
that it allows for enough room to accommodate collective authorship, a central part of the 
production of hip-hop music.  
 There are numerous examples of collective authorship in hip-hop and other African 
diasporic music that challenges the assumption within copyright law that the label of genius can 
only be applied to the lone author. Duke Ellington and Kanye West are two artists firmly situated 
within the tradition of collective authorship, who have also both been called geniuses. Duke 
Ellington is a well-respected jazz musician who “made a regular habit of borrowing melodic 
fragments composed by the soloists in his famed orchestra, then transforming them into hit 
songs” (Poppova). However, some of the musicians in his band objected to this practice because 
Ellington claimed the compositions as his own, although other band members had no problem 
with Ellington’s compilation style of composing (Poppova). It is important to acknowledge the 
musical talent necessary to remember disparate fragments of various melodies and rhythms, and 
then compile them into a hit song. The image of: 
Ellington as a compiler was a recurring impression, but one of ambiguous interpretations 
– was it a creative genius that transformed forgettable bits into timeless masterpieces, or 
an act of betrayal and artistic vanity at the expense of integrity? ….But the real question, 
of course isn’t whether creativity is combinatorial and based on the assemblage of 
existing materials – it is. What Ellington did was simply follow the fundamental impetus 
of the creative spirit to combine and recombine old ideas into new ones (Poppova). 
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This quote directly challenges the assumption within copyright that genius can only manifest 
itself in the form of a singular author. Duke Ellington was firmly embedded in the tradition of 
collective authorship, yet his genius as a composer is undeniable. Despite the narrative that 
equates sampling with theft, all music is “combinatorial” and requires the use of preexisting 
materials to create something new and original.  
Kanye West’s talent reveals itself in his obsessiveness over the sound of individual 
elements in his music. An important way that West is able to achieve the sound he hears in his 
head is by relying on other people’s musical abilities. Craig Bauer— a successful sound engineer 
who mixed West’s first two albums The College Dropout and Late Registration – describes the 
frustration of working with Kanye on a song remembering a message he received after he mixed 
a track saying “Kanye liked the mix, but sent back a laundry of tweaks, including a request that 
the drums ‘knock’ more. ‘Knock’ is a big term in hip-hop these days that relates to frequency” 
(Daley). Bauer also notes that Kanye had “a proclivity to twist sounds” especially his drums 
which are “his signature. There’s always a certain grit to them” (Daley). While Kanye might 
break some rules, he does it in the name of artistry, and his talent as a musician is reminiscent of 
the way in which Duke Ellington was also able to listen to other people’s music and then 
compile it in a unique way.  
The way in which Kanye composes his music exemplifies collective authorship, a 
pervasive type of authorship in African diasporic music. The best example of this collective 
authorship can be found in the production of Kanye’s 2010 album My Beautiful Dark Twisted 
Fantasy. In an article for Complex magazine, journalist Noah Callahan-Belver describes 
traveling to a secluded Hawaiian studio where Kanye was working with some of the biggest 
names in hip-hop, which Callahan-Belver named “Rap Camp” (Callahan-Belver 1). He describes 
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Kanye’s unusual composing style when trying to finish his song “Power”: “Kanye’s process is 
communal—he literally goes around the room asking everyone there what ‘power’ means to 
them, throws out lines to see how they’re received, and works out his exact wording with 
whomever is around to help” (Callahan-Belver 3). One of the musicians at the studio was 
legendary producer Pete Rock who describes hearing another song from the album for the first 
time, “Runaway”: 
as soon as I heard the drums come in, I just started laughing. He used my drums from 
Mecca and the Soul Brother! I used these drums in an interlude before this record called 
‘The Basement’ and those drums come on before the song. I never heard anybody make a 
song the way he made it out of those drums. I thought that was genius (Callahan-Belver 
4).  
This quote reinforces the earlier point that because of the nature of collective authorship, and 
especially challenges to copyright law’s conceptions of artistic genius. Kanye directly borrows a 
recognizable element from Pete Rock, but even Rock is amazed by the recontextualization of his 
own unique sound. West reveals his genius in the way that he is able to compose by compiling 
sounds in a way that sets him apart from other artists.  
It is important to note the moral and ethical complexities of collective authorship. The 
examples of Kanye West and Duke Ellington challenge the narrow conceptions of authorship 
that are embedded within copyright law. The type of collective authorship that characterizes 
West’s music is markedly different from Ellington. While West might reuse a portion of an 
obscure song the same way Ellington uses a melodic riff, Ellington mostly borrowed from his 
bandmates. This means that he interacts musically with his bandmates in a way that is physically 
impossible for West. While there was controversy with the way Ellington reused some of his 
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bandmates musical ideas without giving official credit, the bandmates still knew that Ellington 
used their idea. West could use a portion of an obscure record without giving any kind of 
acknowledgement to the original artist, official or otherwise. Is it ethical for West to sample an 
artist without giving any credit? This is a particularly thorny issue which artists must grapple 
with as well as the legal world.  
The examples of collective authorship that I explained in the previous two paragraphs 
present a narrow view of collective authorship. Collective authorship is an ambiguous term, and 
can reference many different musical practices. While collective authorship is a central feature 
for African diasporic music, this type of creative collaboration is not distinctly characteristic of 
music of the African diaspora. Western classical music is one genre that contains numerous 
instances of collective authorship. Musical borrowing is pervasive in the substantial canon of 
western classical musical works. While the musical borrowing in classical music is categorically 
different from digital sampling, both sampling and classical music illustrate the complexity with 
which the borrowed musical elements are incorporated into a composition. Western classical 
composers most often recycled melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic themes and motifs from earlier 
compositions. The composer George Frederick Handel was involved in some controversy during 
his lifetime as a result of some of his compositions, which noticeably borrowed from other 
composers; later on in his career he often self-borrowed from his earlier compositions, a 
common practice within western classical music (Arewa 602). One of his most inflammatory 
compositions was his oratorio “Israel in Egypt” that used material from every movement of the 
composer Erba’s “Magnificat” (Arewa 601). His reliance on Erba’s piece was so extensive that it 
“engendered significant discussion as to whether Handel should be considered a plagiarist” 
(Arewa 601). 
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Another composer who frequently borrowed from existing compositions was Johann 
Sebastian Bach. Bach was a prolific composer, and practiced extensive self-borrowing in 
addition to borrowing from his numerous family member as well as the composers Telemann, 
Frescobaldi and Albinoi (Arewa 603). Ludwig van Beethoven is yet another example of a 
composer who reworked existing music, most notably using a variety of Ranz, a traditional 
Swiss melody played on an alphorn clearly heard in the opening of the last movement of his 
Pastoral Symphony (Arewa 604). There are numerous other examples within classical music of 
musical borrowing that is firmly rooted in a tradition of collective authorship. As the previous 
examples illustrate, western classical composers borrowed extensively from previous music, in a 
way that has been largely ignored by copyright law. The examples within western classical 
music provide a more complete picture of collective authorship.  
The discussion in this section of iterability, authorial intent, and collective authorship 
illustrates the Herculean task given to lawmakers. Copyright law defines the author in a way that 
has its roots in the definition of an owner within property law. However, the author is a 
decidedly more ambiguous entity. Up to this point, copyright law has not dealt with collective 
authorship despite its pervasiveness throughout all different types of music, not simply digital 
sampling. In the next section, I will introduce some possible reforms that have been suggested 
that could possibly help ameliorate some of the issues presented in this section. 
Moving Towards Reform 
 
Up until this point, my focus has been on specific issues within copyright law as it 
presently exists, and I have repeatedly referenced the need for reform. In this section, I will 
present some possible reforms to the current copyright law that could reduce some of the 
problems that have plagued copyright when it has been applied to hip-hop music. I am not 
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attempting to propose any significant changes to the law in this section, but am merely 
presenting some of the more commonly discussed reforms that I have encountered in my 
research. The possible reforms that I will explain are all specific policy changes that could be 
made, but they are all based on two general principles: One, copyright should be simplified; 
Two, the reforms should come from within the existing body of copyright. These two principles 
will guide my discussion of the reforms, and are principles that should seem fairly obvious.  I 
will present three possible policy changes: One, move away from fair use by clearly demarcating 
which works are public domain; Two, create a compulsory licensing system; Three, move 
towards a liability rule instead of a property rule. These three possible changes almost 
completely cover all of the issues that I introduced over the first three chapters, and they would 
be beneficial for hip-hop artists, the music industry, and the courts who deal with sampling cases.  
 Fair use has been turned into a site of “moral panic” by companies who have a “vested 
interest to preserve the status quo through creating a false enemy” (How to Fix Copyright 212). 
This moral panic is completely fabricated and is supported by entities that “lack any practical 
experience in practicing the doctrine” (How to Fix Copyright 212). A fundamental purpose of 
copyright law is to incentivize the creation of new works, a purpose that could be aided with an 
expansion of fair use. Unfortunately, as my discussion of the cases in chapter 3 illustrated, it is 
very difficult to mount a fair use defense in court. Furthermore, “fair” is an ambiguous concept, 
and one that courts have had difficulty establishing in any clear way (Demers 120). Corporations 
have made it clear that they will vehemently litigate any instance of unlicensed sampling. 
Additionally, these same corporations petition Congress and the Supreme Court to extend the 
length of copyright (Demers 121). All of these factors have led some people to declare that fair 
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use is dead (Demers 121). However, there are ways around fair use that can benefit hip-hop 
artists, as best evidenced by Lawrence Lessig and his company Creative Commons. 
 In his book Free Culture, Lawrence Lessig offers an alternative route for sampling artists 
that allows for transformative use without having to invoke fair use. Creative Commons takes the 
ideals of free culture and puts them into practice. Its aim is to “build a layer of reasonable 
copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build 
on other people’s work, by making it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take 
and build upon their work” (Lessig 282). Authors have the ability to choose from a set of free 
licenses that allow them to establish what other authors can do with the work; These licenses 
range from one that permits any use, so long as attribution is given, to one that permits any use 
so long as no derivative use is made (Lessig 283).  What is particularly interesting about Creative 
Commons is that its aim is to “build a movement of consumers and producers…who help build 
the public domain, and, by their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other 
creativity” (Lessig 283). What is particularly attractive about this ideal is that it does not require 
any substantive change to copyright law, but rather it operates inside the existing structure of 
copyright law. It also is a positive step towards reducing the influence of corporations by 
creating a public domain which will help by “showing people how important that domain is to 
creativity and innovation” (Lessig 286). The construction of a true public domain will help to 
further the goal of achieving public good, a central purpose of copyright. 
 Implicit in this move towards free culture and a true public domain is the need to reduce 
the length of copyright. The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five years 
for corporate authors and the life of the author plus seventy-five years for natural authors (Lessig 
292). This grants substantial power to corporations in particular, and as long as the author still 
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owns the copyright, they still have the right to exclude which discourages sampling practices. 
Lessig explains four principles that can be used to ameliorate this problem: one, keep it short 
enough to incentivize creation, but no longer; two, keep it simple by making the line between 
public domain and protected content explicit so that there is no reason to navigate the 
complexities of fair use; three, require the copyright owner to renew their copyright periodically; 
four, keep it prospective, meaning that whatever the term copyright should be, once the term is 
given it should not be extended.(Lessig 292). The biggest advantage of decreasing the length of 
copyright is the effect it could have on sampling. A decrease in the length of copyright would 
mean that more works will enter the public domain. As more works enter the public domain, 
artists have an increasing sample size to choose from to produce transformative works. A 
movement towards free culture, a clearer demarcation of what works are in the public domain, 
and an effort by artists to support these goals will drastically reduce the negative effect that 
copyright has had on sampling.  
The establishment of a legal framework for hip-hop sampling would also be beneficial in 
reducing confusion over what constitutes a transformative use of a work that is not in the public 
domain. One possible framework that has been suggested would distinguish between three 
distinct types of sampling: sampling in which the original source is unrecognizable, de minimis 
use of a recognizable sample, and finally, instances of sampling where the original source is 
recognizable and not de minimis use (Arewa 641). The framework for determining whether or 
not the sample is recognizable would be the intended audience test as opposed to the current 
system of the average audience test (a problematic legal concept requiring the court to interpret 
an expert witness’s testimony in order to determine whether or not the average observer would 
recognize the source of a sample). It is important to explain one of the potential setbacks of an 
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intended audience test as well as the key benefit to present a full picture of the issue. One 
commonly discussed shortcoming of the intended audience test would be the increased burden it 
would place on the court that results from increased issues of facts, meaning the court would 
need to conduct more analysis (Miller 15). As I explained in chapter 3 when discussing the 
Newton v. Diamond case, the average audience test is a vague and ambiguous concept that is 
therefore extremely difficult to apply in any rigorous, repeatable way. The intended audience test 
would allow the courts to only base their opinion of de minimis use on the testimony of musical 
experts in a case, “essentially looking to the reaction of those with sufficient expertise to 
understand the language of the work, or the intended audience” (Miller 16). There would be 
decreased burden on the court to interpret experts’ testimony as it applies to the average listener 
which would significantly expedite their decision in sampling cases.  
The second possible reform that has been suggested is movement away from a property 
rule towards a liability rule. As I explained earlier in the chapter, one of the fundamental issues 
with copyright law is the inexact fit of property law theories to issues of intellectual property. 
Scholar and copyright critic Siva Vaidhyanathan has argued that the debate surrounding 
intellectual property should move towards intellectual policy because “copyright issues are now 
more about large corporations limiting access to and use of their products, and less about lonely 
songwriters snapping their pencil tips under the glare of bare bulbs (Vaidhyanathan xxvi). The 
discussion should move away from determining ways to prevent theft towards a copyright policy 
that would “encourage creative expression without limiting the prospects for future creators”       
(Vaidhyanathan xxvi). The notion of copyright infringement as theft is particularly pernicious 
because it completely ignores the practice of borrowing in all types of musical composition. By 
referring specifically to hip-hop sampling as theft, copyright law makes a value judgment about 
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the practice of sampling, inaccurately differentiating it from other types of musical production. 
One possible way to reduce the positioning of sampling as theft, would be to move to a liability 
rule, which would be particularly useful by abolishing the right to exclude. 
 Law professor Olufunmilayo B. Arewa explains that a liability rule could significantly 
“facilitate access to copyrighted works for those whose aesthetic style incorporates use of 
existing works while retaining the economic rights of copyright owners” (Arewa 638). A liability 
rule is related to torts which are civil wrongs resulting in injury; the primary aim of torts is to 
provide relief for the damages incurred (“Tort”, Legal Information Institute). A liability rule is 
particularly useful for sampling cases because it creates an environment where borrowing is 
normal. This would mean that certain types of borrowing would be permitted under the 
framework, and in the event of an unfair use the copyright owner would be entitled to 
compensation (Arewa 639).  A liability rule also fosters more innovation with future creators 
having less restricted access to use existing material creatively, and the ability to deal with issues 
of liability and compensation after the fact (Arewa 639). The establishment of a liability rule is 
would also make the establishment of a compulsory licensing system much more realistic and 
beneficial for sampling artists.  
The third and final possible change that could be made to copyright law is directly related 
to the establishment of a liability rule, and would benefit from having that system in place. The 
final possible reform I will explain is the establishment of a compulsory licensing system for 
sound recordings. This is a solution that numerous scholars have already proposed and would be 
fairly simple to enact since a compulsory licensing system already exists for licensing the rights 
to an original composition as explained in section 115 of the United States Copyright law. The 
benefits of such a system are numerous and clearly explained in the current literature. However, 
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it is important to also note some of the possible shortcomings of a compulsory licensing system. 
A compulsory licensing system would benefit hip-hop artists because it would make licenses for 
transformative sampling much easier to obtain, more clearly demarcate the line between fair use 
and when a sample should be licensed, and eliminate a confusing distinction between covers and 
transformative sampling of sound recordings (Vrana 859). Furthermore it would remove “artistic 
determination from courts that seem unwilling to make the case-by-case decisions that 
transformative uses depend on” (Vrana 860). The system would also financially benefit all artists 
involved, both the sampled artist and the artists who transform the sample. Some of the most 
compelling arguments against a compulsory licensing system claim that the system creates “too 
much of a bright line rule” and that it would “require reform of the entire copyright system 
including the composition compulsory license” (Vrana 856). Despite these perceived 
shortcomings, the benefits of a compulsory licensing system for sound recordings would be a 
significant improvement over the free market system that exists which inevitably leads to 
licensing fees that are only affordable for the wealthiest artists. While these three possible 
reforms would certainly be somewhat difficult to enact, they could significant aid the effort to 
demystify some of the more confusing elements of copyright law. The reforms would be an 
important step towards creating a legal environment that is not only conducive to sampling, but 
one that encourages borrowing as the norm. 
The three reforms that I have explored in this section attempt to deal with the issues of 
originality and authorship within a specifically legal framework. However, it is also important to 
consider these issues outside of a legal perspective. There could be simpler changes that artists 
themselves can make that would not require the intervention of the law. The main area I would 
like to explore is the issue of sampling artists acknowledgement the original musicians of the 
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music they sample. The previous example of Creative Commons provides a basic framework for 
the creation of a community that values collaborative creation, while still protecting the 
importance of the rights of the author.  Creative Commons sets clear legal guideline that allow 
for individual authors to determine the amount of access other artists have to their compositions. 
Although the right of an artist to sample is a central concern of this thesis, it does not mean that 
the rights of the author are any less important. The issue of artistic integrity is central in this 
discussion. Using the framework provided by Creative Commons, it is possible to imagine an 
artistic community that values the rights of the author as much as the sampler from a moral 
perspective. It is problematic that a hip-hop artist can sample a breakbeat from an obscure soul or 
funk artist and not give any indication where they took the sample. The sampling artist could 
give credit to the original artist by simply saying where the sample is from, without any 
monetary compensation. Maybe that could lead to people listening to the original artist because 
they heard the breakbeat and knew where they could find it. A community that values this sort of 
public recognition could help to resolve some of the issues of authorship and ownership in a way 
that does not require legal intervention. This collaborative environment is attractive because it 
can accept the ambiguities of originality and authorship in ways that are impossible for the law. 
In the next section, I will continue this discussion by revisiting sampling ethics within the hip-
hop community. 
Conclusion: Sampling Ethics Redux 
At the end of chapter 1, I introduced Joseph Schloss’s rules that he formulated based on his 
research conducting interviews with underground hip-hop producers. I would like to reflect back 
on those rules, updating them based on the technological changes that have occurred since 
Schloss performed his research. The corporations that exert significant control over the music 
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industry have tried to establish a narrative that equates sampling with theft. The corporations try 
to act as cultural gatekeepers, determining what kind of music is objectively accepted by popular 
culture, and attempting to undermine musical pursuits like hip-hop that they ostensibly view as 
objectively less artistic. My goal in presenting Schloss’s rules of an internal sampling ethic was 
to counter the narrative that hip-hop artists sample out of laziness. Schloss’s rules were very 
helpful in this respect because they illustrated that hip-hop is able to police itself through the lens 
of hip-hop authenticity. The internal lens of authenticity is a mechanism for other hip-hop artists 
to determine what types of sampling are acceptable, and when the line is crossed that makes 
sampling unethical. The only issue with Schloss’s definition is that it is narrow in its scope, 
applying generally to underground hip-hop artists in the 1990s. In this section, I will profile one 
of the most influential underground hip-hop producers today: El-P. I will also introduce the term 
“virtual digging”, a variation of crate digging – the mode of acquiring samples favored by early 
producers, which generally involves going to a record store and looking for vinyl records to 
sample from – which has become increasingly popular among producers due to the ease of 
technology for locating samples, and the decline of traditional record stores around the country.  
 El-P is one of the most influential underground hip-hop artists currently making music. In 
an interview with Pitchfork back in 2002, the interviewer, Sam Chennault wrote that, “Perhaps 
no other individual over the past five years has been as important in the formation of what we 
call underground hip-hop as El-P” (Chennault). El-P has been a producer and rapper for 21 
years. Starting off as a member of popular underground group Company Flow, he later went on 
to start the influential hip-hop label Definitive Jux and now works with some of the most 
influential rappers in underground hip-hop including rap group Das Racist and Killer Mike 
(“Behind the Boards Producer Profile: El-P”). El-P’s production style while he was in the group 
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Company Flow is noted for its “slightly distorted samples [that] blend horns, a funky beat, and a 
recording of someone whistling together into a cohesive whole, ending up as a more lo-fi take on 
the traditionalist boom-bap that ruled NYC in the early ‘90s” (“Behind the Boards Producer 
Profile”: El-P). El-P’s unique production style continued to progress adding “touches of 
weirdness, including sci-fi-esque sound effects…and a generally chaotic feel absent from most 
hip-hop of the era” (“Behind the Boards Producer Profile:El-P”).  
El-P is noted for his experimental approach to production, especially when it comes to his 
incorporation of samples. When asked about his approach to sampling, El-P has said that “you 
really have to be a different type of producer now, so that you can create without having to worry 
about being sued”(El-P: Def by Manipulation). He also said that he liked to “take the mood of a 
sample and completely manipulate and change it to the point where it’s totally unrecognizable, 
but it still retains some spirit of the original” (El-P: Def by Manipulation). An example of this 
technique can be heard on his song “Tasmanian Pain Coaster” from his album I’ll Sleep When 
I’m Dead, which features a chopped up sample of a sitar, that El-P manipulated by changing the 
order of the notes and running it through tremolo and other effects to get the final sound (El-P: 
Def by Manipulation). 
El-P is unique as a modern hip-hop producer because he uses an overwhelming amount 
of outboard gear – equipment that is not a part of the Digital Audio Workstation’s effects used to 
alter sounds – mainly made up of “pedals and filters and oscillators” used “to take a sample, 
change it and bring it back into the computer” (Noz). El-P’s musicianship shines through in his 
mastery of the music equipment and technology available to modern producers. He is a self-
described “producer nerd” who doesn’t want “people to listen to [his] records and feel like they 
can identify where the sounds are coming from. I want them to feel like it’s something that they 
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don’t understand or that they can’t pigeonhole”(Noz). Recently, El-P released a unique mash-up 
track where he asked his fans on Twitter who the “most anti downloading/digital music 
musicians were” and decided on Metallica and Prince (Young). He then released a mash-up for 
free which combined Metallica’s “Unforgiven Part 2 with Prince’s “Purple Rain”. El-P has 
shown throughout his career that he is truly unique, yet he works within the classic hip-hop 
styles. His technique of obscuring samples to the point of unrecognizability shows how hip-hop 
artists will continue to sample in unique ways, and do not rely on the popularity of the records 
they are sampling to make music. 
Technology has revolutionized hip-hop, especially when it comes to the practice of crate 
digging. As I noted in chapter one, crate digging is the practice by which producers look for 
records that they can sample from historically going to record stores. However, the growth of 
music distribution online has forced many record stores to go out of business, and many 
producers have started taking advantage of the ease with which they can acquire sound 
recordings instantly on the internet (Rocca). I will refer to this new type of digging as “virtual 
digging”, a term which nicely encapsulates the various methods that are used to acquire samples 
online. “Virtual digging” is a contentious issue within the hip-hop community, mainly because of 
the switch from the vinyl records of classic crate digging, to the mp3 which the most common 
format for virtual digging. A producer sampling an mp3 that they found on the internet violates 
another one of Joseph Schloss’s observed rules, specifically the rule that a producer can only 
sample from vinyl. Despite this desire to cling to the vinyl roots of hip-hop, 
[t]he need for discovery outweighed the limitations of the marketplace. Hip hop 
producers began evolving in response to the shuttered windows of record stores…In 
2005, the birth of YouTube and the widespread access of free obscure music via blogs 
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changed the process for traditional hip hop sampling forever. This began the separation of 
‘Collection and ‘Tools’; a crate digger’s vinyl collection stalled as their online tools for 
the trade of making beats expanded exponentially (Rocca). 
A quick Google search reveals a number of different blogs and online forums filled with crate 
diggers searching for obscure records. One such blog is called the Vinyl Frontier, run by one user 
named Reef Ali who posts nearly an album a day, and seems to particularly favor records from 
the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s (The Vinyl Frontier). 
 YouTube seems to be the most popular location for producers to find their samples. Paul 
White, a producer from the U.K. says that he samples mainly from YouTube and MP3s, and says 
that “you’d be surprised how much material released has come from YouTube” (Rocca). One 
younger producer named Small Professor has been strictly sampling from MP3s his entire beat 
making career, but he pays homage to the vinyl lineage by layering static sampled from vinyl to 
achieve a more authentic sound (Rocca). Another technique that Small Professor uses when 
digging is to “type something crazy” generally involving the word trippy on YouTube and going 
through the results (Rocca). This do-it-yourself aesthetics illustrates the powerful effect that the 
collective hip-hop aesthetic has on any young artist who begins making hip-hop music. Another 
way that producers challenge themselves is to search for obscure samples. One producer named 
Blockhead, “never wants to know an artist existed prior to finding them” (Rocca). Modern day 
producers, while not adhering to the Schloss’s strict guideline of sampling ethics, still use their 
own newly developed techniques to challenge themselves. The way in which a producer digs for 
samples online is not overly dissimilar from crate digging. The goal is to find a unique sample 
that fits into the producer’s own aesthetic which helps them to craft their own style, which 
simultaneously differentiates them from other producers while still being firmly within a hip-hop 
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tradition. This aesthetic is common throughout hip-hop. Artists develop their own style by using 
unoriginal sounds and making them original. The phenomenon of “virtual digging” still valorizes 
many of the same aesthetic ideals of crate digging, and represents a recognizable hip-hop 
aesthetic.  
 Corporations acting as cultural gatekeepers for the music industry will undoubtedly 
continue to litigate, increase licensing costs, and use any other method to discourage the practice 
of unlicensed sampling. Despite increased costs associated with sampling that have made some 
producers wary of using samples in their work, hip-hop artists create new techniques that 
obscure, transform, and recontextualize their samples. The narrative that emerged from sampling 
critics who argued that hip-hop and other sampling based music is a musical shortcut for 
producers is simply untrue. Hip-hop culture’s rich history of collective authorship has created a 
strong sense of community with a set of clearly definable set of internal sampling ethics that 
govern artistic integrity for hip-hop producers. Hip-hop culture collectively challenges their 
artists, producers especially, to create music that is new and exciting, yet undeniably hip-hop. 
While the specific set of ethics may differ depending on when the artist began producing, and 
what subgenre of hip-hop they identify with, they still work within an ethical code. It is clear that 
copyright needs to be reformed to incorporate concepts of originality and collective authorship 
that are associated with music of the African diaspora. Until it does, copyright will not be able to 
fulfill its true purpose, completely and unequivocally protecting the creative rights of artists. 
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